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1.  Executive Summary 
 
Particular features of Canada’s capital market inform our consideration of moving towards 
a more proportionate regulatory system, specifically, Canada has a large number of small 
public companies; its market cap is concentrated largely in four provinces; it has a 
particular focus on mining, resources and technology; and a significant number of issuers 
are cross-listed on US exchanges. Canadian securities regulators have already recognized 
some measure of proportionate regulation in their national instruments, based on the type 
of listing.  
 
The paper suggests that a number of overriding principles or considerations should be taken 
into account in respect of a further move towards proportionate regulation.  They include: 
 
• Proportionate regulation must balance access to capital and the long term sustainability 
of the market; a key objective is maintaining the integrity of Canadian capital markets.  
 
• The benchmark of the regulatory system continues to be materiality, in that while 
periodic disclosure or other compliance requirements may be proportionate, all issuers 
must continue to ensure that material change is disclosed to the market in a timely, 
accurate and comprehensible manner, a requirement that should not be scaled. 
 
• Decision making in respect of adopting further proportionate regulation should be 
timely, transparent and relevant for market participants and should be implemented 
only after broad consultation.  A possible methodology is to identify a problem or 
difficulty that may justify a proportionate response and then work with market 
participants to scale the requirement appropriately, using one or more of the tools cited 
above or other problem solving strategies. 
 
• There is a need for transparency and bright line delineation in respect of which issuers 
fall in which category of proportionate regulatory requirements. 
 
• Investors must have a clear understanding of the risk associated with issuers that 
comply with modified disclosure and governance requirements, including explanatory 
notes on periodic reporting documents and prospectuses, public education and plain 
language disclosure. 
 
• If the delineation is venture/non-venture, smaller issuers on the TSX and comparable 
exchanges must be given guidance regarding compliance with the more extensive 
requirements. 
 
• If the delineation is market capitalization, at either end of the market size, there is a 
need for well-founded and transparent criteria on which to make a determination of 
which category issuers are located. 
 
• Disclosed risk factors should be focused for all issuers, not overly generalized. 
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• Any proportionate regulation must be accompanied by consistent and rigorous 
compliance and enforcement, to ensure integrity of the market. 
 
• Proportionate regulation can be used to reduce disproportionate compliance costs by 
eliminating regulatory compliance requirements where they do not add value to the 
integrity of the market. 
 
• Any proportionate regulation should recognize the extensive oversight of junior issuers 
by the TSXV. 
 
• Any proportionate regulation must ensure that the costs of compliance associated with 
any new requirements do not outweigh the benefits to market participants. 
 
• Under a shift to a principles/standards/outcomes-based system, all market participants 
must have a shared understanding of regulatory expectations, specifically, what broad 
high level principles mean in practice.  
 
o Develop high level principles that are universal and allow junior issuers to 
develop best practices sensitive to their structure and needs. 
o The flexibility of principles/standards/outcomes regulation should be used to 
focus requirements on junior issuers, rather than create opaque expectations. 
o There should be recognition that there is a continuum of principles/standards 
and outcomes-based regulation, and that any further shifts should occur after 
measured consideration of benefits to the market, involving broad based and 
meaningful consultation. 
o Any evolution from existing standards should be measured, in terms of 
assessing what outcomes a shift from current rules to principles or outcomes is 
aimed at achieving and measuring the effectiveness of any shifts. 
o Regulators assessing good governance practice should share that experience 
with other market participants, increasing the overall knowledge base of good 
practice. 
o Resources need to be directed towards junior issuers in terms of supporting any 
shift to principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation and transparent and 
accessible guidance on best practice, so that junior issuers can develop the 
capacity to meet practice compliance under any adopted principles. 
o Resources are needed to allow junior issuers to participate in a meaningful way 
with regulators in developing future policy or practice. 
o Set appropriate strategic milestones for junior or small issuers. 
 
• Consultation regarding any shift to proportionate regulation and 
principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation should be broad, including all market 
participants, advocacy organizations and exchanges. 
 
• Any further move towards proportionate regulation should engage market participants 
in consideration of regulatory standards and how they differentially impact market 
participants. 
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• There should be wide-spread public education regarding the different risks associated 
with issuers that are proportionately regulated. 
 
• Evaluation of proportionate regulation, under whatever type of system is adopted, 
should measure outcomes against clearly articulated goals, including assessing clear 
milestones, measure the culture of compliance, cost effectiveness, ease of 
implementation, reduction of investor and market risk, and benefits to market 
participants. 
 
o Regulators need to develop tools for assessing compliance if a 
principles/standards and outcomes based approach is adopted. 
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2.  Introduction 
 
The Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in Canada is to examine the best way to improve 
securities regulation in Canada.1  Part of that mandate is to consider adoption of a 
proportionate regulation regime.  This paper explores the potential for proportionate 
regulation of reporting issuers, including defining options for what such a system may 
entail, and the underlying policy rationale.2  While previous studies have made reference to 
the need to consider proportionate regulation, the contours and limits of adoption of such a 
strategy have not been articulated in the public policy debate.   
 
There are two basic questions to such an inquiry.  First, what objectives of Canadian 
securities law would proportionate regulation meet, both in terms of the substantive law 
and the regulatory framework?  Second, how can one delineate issuers by size or type, in 
terms of the criteria to be applied?  This paper commences with a discussion of the context 
for the proportionate regulation debate; then considers these two questions, including a 
discussion of how proportionate regulation has already been adopted, to a limited extent, in 
Canada.  It considers principles that might be applied in considering future proportionate 
regulation.   
 
Part 3 examines the context for the paper.  Part 4 examines the objectives of Canadian 
securities law that proportionate regulation may be responsive to, including efficient capital 
markets and investor protection.  It examines the challenges for introducing proportionate 
regulation under various regulatory models, including the passport and common securities 
regulator models, principles or outcomes based regulation, and cross-border harmonization 
considerations.  Part 5 explores how one can delineate issuers for regulatory purposes, 
including type of listing, market capitalization and revenue based approaches, using 
examples in Canada, the UK and the US.  While the focus of the paper is on small or junior 
issuers, Part 6 briefly discusses implications of a proportionate regulation system for 
seasoned or larger issuers.   Part 7 sets out broad principles and basic tools to move towards 
proportionate regulation.  Part 8 concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 The Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in Canada is to provide advice and recommendations to the 
Minister of Finance and the provincial and territorial ministers responsible for securities regulation.  
Information in this paper is current to July 31, 2008.  The author deeply appreciates the cooperation of 
regulators from across Canada, and, in particular, appreciates the assistance of Douglas Hyndman and Sandy 
Jakab of the British Columbia Securities Commission, William Rice of the Alberta Securities Commission, 
and Kevan Cowan and John McCoach of TMX Group.  Thanks also to Bernard Lau, UBC Law II for research 
assistance.  
2
 The mandate of this paper was confined to reporting issuers only, and there are different considerations for 
small registrants and other market participants. 
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3.  The Context 
 
The issue of proportionate regulation arises because of the unique structure of the Canadian 
capital market, which is primarily national, with distinct regional features.  Canadian based 
issuers represent approximately 96 per cent of the companies listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) and TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV) and 92 per cent of the aggregate 
market capital of public companies, while foreign issuers represent a relatively small, but 
increasing, number of total TSX and TSXV listings.3  There are over 4,000 issuers on the 
TSX and TSXV, with an average size of $1.3 billion on the senior market and $22.6 
million on the junior market.4  The TSX is the largest small-to-medium enterprise (SME) 
exchange in North America, and second in the world based on the number of issuers listed.5  
Canada’s public equities market is a tiered market with 59 per cent of companies listed on 
the TSXV.6   More than a third of TSX listed issuers, 1,373, are mining companies.7  Based 
on aggregate market capital, the oil & gas industry is the most significant industry in 
Canada, at 25 per cent, followed by financial services at 24.8 per cent and mining at 17 per 
cent.8  Many issuers on the TSXV are at the development or exploration stage. 
 
Based on aggregate market capital of companies with head offices in the respective 
provinces, the largest provincial markets are Ontario at 40 per cent, Alberta at 26 per cent, 
Québec at 11 per cent, and British Columbia at 8 per cent.9  These provinces represent  
92 per cent of all public companies listed on the TSX and TSXV.10  In terms of average 
market capital, Alberta is highest at $785 million; Ontario is at $700 million, Québec at 
$653 million and British Columbia at $133 million.11  Much of the Canadian capital market 
is made up of SME issuers in the public equities market.12   
                                                     
3
 Rik Parkhill, Interim Co-CEO, TSX Group Inc., Speech to 8th Annual Metals and Mining Conference of 
The New York Society of Security Analysts, June 4, 2008, 
http://www.tsx.com/en/news_events/speeches/#Jun04-08, at 4. He observed that the TSX added 49 new 
international listings in 2007. There are 30 Australian mining companies and 12 South African mining 
companies on the TSX or TSXV, at 6.  In 2007 alone, 219 new resource companies listed on TSX Group 
exchanges, including 13 from the U.S., 9 from Australia, 2 from each of South America, China and the U.K. 
At the end of last year, TSX had 58 Chinese and Chinese related companies, and to June 2008, three Chinese 
issuers have joined the TSX, to total 60 Chinese issuers, making the TSX one of the top three exchanges for 
the number of Chinese listings.  The aggregate market capital of companies listed on the TSX and TSXV is 
$2.15 trillion, up from $1.17 trillion five years.  
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. at 6. TSX Group is second in the world based on the number of issuers listed on our exchanges. The 
exchange with the largest number of issuers is the Bombay Stock Exchange, the small company exchange in 
Mumbai, India. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. at 7.  
8
 Based on TSX and TSXV data as at December 31, 2007; Alberta Securities Commission (ASC). The 
Alberta Capital Market: A Comparative Overview, 2008, Report, May, 2008: 
http://www.albertasecurities.com/news/ASC%20Publications/6116/The%20Alberta%20Capital%20Market.p
df, last accessed August 3, 2008 at 4. 
9
 Ibid. at 3. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. at 5. 
12
 Income trusts represent almost 9 per cent of the aggregate market capital in Canada and 6 per cent of the 
listings on the TSX and TSXV. The aggregate market capital associated with income trusts has decreased 
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Each regional market has some unique characteristics. Ontario has the greatest number 
listed on the TSX, followed by Alberta, and both have more issuers with over $1 billion in 
market capital than other jurisdictions.  British Columbia has the largest number listed on 
the TSXV, followed by Ontario and then Alberta.13  628 of British Columbia’s TSXV 
listed issuers have market capital of less than $10 million, whereas the province has fewer 
companies than Alberta or Ontario listed on the TSX with market capital of over $250 
million.14  Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia all have strong junior markets, although 
the concentration differs, with mining significant in British Columbia, oil & gas in Alberta 
and technology and mining in Ontario.15  84 per cent of British Columbia based companies 
have a market capital of under $100 million, whereas this figure is 69 per cent for Alberta. 
Alberta’s public equities market is a tiered market with a relatively even distribution of 
small, medium and large companies.16  Companies with market capital of less than $25 
million represent 49 per cent of Alberta’s capital market, 40 per cent of Ontario’s capital 
market, 56 per cent of Québec’s capital market and 67 per cent of British Columbia’s 
capital market.   
 
Canada has the largest number of mining companies listed on its stock exchanges in the 
world. More than one third of TSX listed issuers, 1,373, are mining companies, twice as 
many as the next strongest mining exchange, which is Australia’s ASX, and six times as 
many as the London Stock Exchange and AIM.17  Hence, Canada has a large number of 
small public companies; its market cap is concentrated largely in four provinces; it has a 
particular focus on mining, resources and technology; and a significant number of issuers 
are cross-listed on US exchanges.  These particular features drive any consideration of 
moving towards a more proportionate regulatory system. 
 
The structure of the Canadian capital market suggests that there may be different capacities 
to engage in regulatory compliance with respect to the proliferation of regulatory change 
implemented or being considered in the post-Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Act era.  A 
principal mechanism by which regulators exercise oversight is through disclosure 
requirements for entry and participation in the market, from the offering stage through to 
the periodic disclosure of financial statements and the timely and accurate disclosure of 
material changes.  More recently, there have been requirements to disclose corporate 
governance practice and internal financial controls, measuring such practices against 
suggested norms, creating another set of compliance requirements.  These requirements are 
part of participation in modern capital markets, whether an issuer is listed only in Canada 
or seeks capital in the US and other markets.  Issuers necessarily consider the 
administrative and resource costs of disclosure compliance in their choice of market.  Yet 
the question is whether existing or proposed regulatory requirements ought to be applied in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
almost 4 per cent and the number of income trusts has decreased by almost 16 per cent in the past year, 
largely due to changes in federal tax law, ibid. at 6. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
  Ibid. at 11. 
15
 Ibid. at 5. 
16
 Ibid. at 4. 
17
 Parkhill, supra, note 3 at 7. 
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the same manner or to the same extent for all issuers, given the different structure of the 
Canadian market and the large number of small and junior issuers. 
 
A number of studies have observed that securities regulation can be an obstacle to small 
business finance and continued participation in the market.18  Due to fixed compliance 
costs, small firms are disproportionately affected because larger public issuers have more 
resources at their disposal than junior issuers, and the costs of compliance per dollar of 
revenue generated may be lower than for junior issuers.  Larger issuers can often rely on 
their own personnel to comply with securities regulations rather than having to outsource 
internal auditing, legal work, and compliance.  Junior issuers frequently incur the costs of 
such external assistance.   
 
Often the internal expertise of a junior issuer includes geologists, engineers and other 
professionals in the sector that the junior issuer is engaged in research and development or 
exploration, and they have not yet hired much financial expertise, relying on underwriters, 
auditors and legal advisors for that assistance.  They often have relatively fewer managerial 
resources; and the time required to qualify securities under a prospectus is frequently 
longer.  Managers of junior issuers are usually aware of regulatory requirements, but often 
daunted by the complexity of disclosure and other rules.   
 
The cost of compliance with new internal control requirements can frequently be 
disproportionate to the need for such controls given the size of the issuer; and such costs 
may outweigh any benefit of protection for investors.  Junior issuers may have limited 
access to audit assistance from big accounting firms that direct their energy first towards 
their larger clients, creating issues in respect of compliance deadlines.  Corporate 
governance and accountability structures designed for large and complex organizations are 
frequently too onerous for junior issuers, who may have only limited personnel and a 
governance structure that is essentially just direct accountability to senior officers.   
 
Junior issuers may have difficulty meeting independent director best practice requirements, 
given increased compensation and insurance costs for such directors.19  Given that junior 
issuers are frequently not yet generating revenue, they have not invested in governance 
structures and controls, and such controls may be unhelpful given their stage of 
development and may direct valuable resources away from developing the business.  In 
turn, excessive or inappropriately directed regulation may create a serious market 
disadvantage for junior issuers.  
 
                                                     
18
 H. Y. Chiu, “Can UK Small Businesses Obtain Growth Capital in Public Equity Markets? An Overview of 
Shortcomings in UK and European Securities Regulation” (2003) 3 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 933-
977; Ontario Securities Commission, Task Force on Small Business Financing, Final report (1996), 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Publications/op_small_business.pdf ; J.L. Huffman, “The Impact of 
Regulation on Small and Emerging Business” (2000) 4 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 307-
317; Ginger Carroll, “Thinking Small: Adjusting Regulatory Burdens Incurred by Small Public Companies 
Seeking to Comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, (2006) 58 Ala. L. Rev. 443; Interim Report of the 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 30 November, 2006, online: http://www.capmktsreg.org. 
19
 Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance”, (2005) 114 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1588. 
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(a) Lack of Empirical Data 
 
The precise scope of barriers that small or junior issuers face in Canada has not, however, 
been well documented empirically, in terms of study on the true impact of proportionate 
regulation or its absence.  One recent empirical study on the effects of the 2001 changes to 
Canadian private placement regulations to facilitate access to equity financing by SMEs 
observed a statistically significant effect only on the number of issues by closed 
corporations; and the authors concluded that the study results did not confirm the policy 
argument that securities regulation was a major constraint to small business capital raising, 
although they acknowledged that the results did not rule out that the reforms eased some 
financing.20  US scholars examining a number of empirical studies relating to Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (S-Ox) regulatory requirements concluded that there was evidence that S-Ox had 
a disproportionately negative impact on smaller firms, at least at its initial implementation, 
but the evidence was not conclusive in respect of long-term effects.21  Hence, while 
uniform regulation is likely in some instances to be onerous to smaller issuers, there needs 
to be further empirical study of precisely the extent to which the problem exists, how it 
affects capital raising processes, and how any changes could respond to such problems. 
 
Similarly, there is little empirical data on the extent to which junior or smaller issuers do or 
do not pose higher risks to the marketplace from governance, financial or regulatory 
compliance deficiencies.  Where such issuers are seeking capital, there is a considerable 
amount of information in the market because of the need for the issuer to attract 
underwriter support and meet prospectus and other regulatory requirements.  However, in 
the periods between offerings, there may be less market and regulatory scrutiny, posing 
some risk to secondary market investors.  While the quantum of potential harm to investors 
could be lower than from larger issuers, given the size of market capitalization, the risk of 
non-compliant behaviour could be higher for some firms that lack the resources, skill or 
information to ensure best practices and regulatory compliance.  Junior issuers are often 
relationship based, and the degree of best practices may depend largely on the senior 
officers and the culture of compliance and best practice encouraged.  There appears to be 
little data to support or negate the extent of risks unique to junior issuers.  Regulatory 
compliance and governance risks need to be distinguished from the higher risks associated 
with the inherent nature of a junior issuer in its exploratory or research and development 
stage. 
 
With that important caveat about the availability of Canadian data, this paper considers 
proportionate regulation as a policy choice.  The degree of regulation on the activities of 
market participants must be proportionate to the regulatory objectives.   
                                                     
20
 Cecile Carpentier, Jean-Francois L’Her and Jean-Marc Suret, “Does Securities Regulation Constrain Small 
Business Finance? An Empirical Analysis”, forthcoming in (2008) Small Business Economics,  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1131792, last accessed July 25, 2008. The changes came about as a result of an OSC 
Task Force, which found that in respect of public financings, the costs of preparing and filing a prospectus 
and related costs are borne disproportionately by SMEs because the direct costs are relatively higher for 
smaller offerings, at 7. 
21
 Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Eric Talley, “Sarbanes-Oxley’s Effects on Small Firms: What is the 
Evidence?” (June 2007), USC CLEO Research Paper No. C07-9, http://ssrn.com/abstract=993198; but see the 
study by Wu et al, discussed below under the Part on public float. 
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The financing needs of junior issuers vary significantly depending on the type of business 
and stage of development, as financing is usually a multi-stage process.  There is no 
common standard for defining small issuers or junior issuers.  They are variously defined 
by reference to their market capitalization, type of listing, revenues, assets, debt facilities, 
length of operating history and ownership structure.  
  
4.   What Objectives of Canadian Securities Law Would Proportionate Regulation 
Meet?  
 
“Proportionate”, “scaled” or “measured” regulation is the notion that securities regulation 
should recognize the different risks and benefits of issuers by their size, experience in the 
market, resources or capacity to act.  Its underlying premise is that junior issuers often do 
not have the resources or personnel to comply with the full range of disclosure and other 
regulatory requirements. Given the size and nature of their capital needs, regulators in some 
jurisdictions have concluded that small or junior issuers pose lower risk to the market, and 
should be subject to different or less onerous requirements.22 Other regulators, such as in 
the US, have concluded that larger seasoned issuers should also receive scaled treatment 
because of their record in the market and the availability of more information over a 
sustained period.23 
 
Proportionate regulation can mean a range of options, from exemption from particular 
regulatory compliance to a range of measured or scaled adjustment of specific requirements 
for particular size or type of issuer. 
 
(a)  Efficient Capital Markets and Investor Protection 
 
In Canada, securities laws articulate two concurrent goals: to foster fair and efficient capital 
markets; and to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent 
practices.  British Columbia describes these goals as fostering a securities market that is 
fair and warrants public confidence, with a dynamic and competitive securities industry 
that provides investment opportunities and access to capital.24  While sometimes 
juxtaposed as competing objectives, these concurrent goals are really aspects of the same 
challenge, as investor protection is a necessary element of fostering confidence in the 
market such that capital can be raised in a timely and efficient manner.  Proportionate 
regulation can advance these concurrent goals.   
 
Regulatory requirements should advance the public’s understanding of the risks inherent in 
the issuer’s activities.  Where disclosure and other regulatory requirements do not advance 
public policy goals, they should not be required.  Scaled requirements that allow the market 
access to the information required to make effective investment choices can assist with 
                                                     
22
 See the discussion below in respect of the FSA in the UK and the SEC in the US.  Some may contest that 
they impose lower risk to the market. 
23
 See the discussion in Part 5 below. 
24
 British Columbia Securities Commission Service Plan 2008-2011, 
http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/ServicePlan_2008-2011.pdf. See also British Columbia Securities 
Commission (BCSC), submission to Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, June, 2008, www.bcsc.ca. 
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raising capital on a less costly basis.  Investors are protected through continued, but more 
focused requirements, but they must be able to fully appreciate any demarcation in terms of 
different standards being applied.  A critical aspect of any proportionate regulation is to 
ensure that the integrity of regulatory requirements and the rigour of enforcement are 
maintained. 
 
The objectives of securities regulation and the principles of transparency, fairness and 
certainty underlay any policy choices.  The categorization of issuers that will have different 
regulatory requirements must be transparent for capital market participants.  Transparency 
for issuers is necessary in terms of understanding qualifying criteria and regulatory 
obligations; for understanding when they would transition from one set of regulatory 
requirements to another, either upward or downward, based on issuer definitions. 
Transparency is also essential for investors, their advisors, and other consumers of 
securities in terms of their understanding the different reporting and oversight protections, 
so that they can make appropriate assessments of risk and return.  Regulators must also 
have clear expectations of issuers in continuing disclosure and other aspects of securities 
law, in order to appropriately assess compliance; facilitate options for joint problem 
solving; allow for effective risk-based enforcement; and in order to understand the legal 
standard of proof to be met in any enforcement activities. 
 
The objective of protection of investors from particular kinds of market conduct also 
engages notions of fairness in considering proportionate regulation.  For issuers, this 
concern is fairness in terms of what side of a demarcation line the issuer falls on and the 
consequent regulatory requirements.  If the measure for the smaller issuer is market 
capitalization, for example, the issue is what are the appropriate cutoff points 
distinguishing the size of issuer.  With respect to investors and other consumers, fairness is 
engaged in terms of their reasonable expectations of the role of regulators in their oversight 
of market participants.  The delineation of what companies may be subject to different time 
requirements or differently focused disclosure requirements may not create unfairness if 
there is transparent notice to consumers that different standards apply and clear policy 
reasons for different standards.  Examples are the oil & gas and mining sectors, where there 
are specialized requirements for disclosure, aimed at allowing potential investors and 
others to have particular technical data in order to make informed choices regarding 
potential risk and return in their capital investment.25        
 
Another consideration for investor protection is the role of market participants other than 
regulators, as sources of information in the market about both junior and senior issuers.  
Analyst following and underwriter involvement provide external information to the market; 
and one issue is the extent to which this scrutiny or analysis serves an investor protection 
function.  For example, in a study of 100 Canadian issuers with 10 firms in each of ten 
market ranges of capitalization, Pritchard and Choi found that analyst coverage increases 
with issuer size, although they also found that small issuers making an offering were also 
                                                     
25
 See for example, NI 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities, 2002, as amended effective 
December 28, 2007 and NI 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects, 2001, as amended effective 
December 30, 2005. 
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likely to have analyst coverage.26  Out of the firms making offerings in their study, only 
two issuers under a market cap of $345 million had no analyst coverage.  Based on that 
analysis, Pritchard subsequently suggested that issuers with a market cap of greater than 
$345 million had better analyst coverage such that they should qualify for well-known 
seasoned issuer (WKSI) type treatment in Canada.27  In developing the category of issuers 
for WKSI treatment in the US, the SEC relied on analyst coverage as one of the factors.28  
Thus, proportionate regulation may have to take account of the fact that there is lower 
analyst coverage for junior or small issuers.  Analyst coverage of junior issuers is likely to 
be less, although where they are seeking capital through an offering, the amount of 
coverage increases.29   
 
This lower coverage may be offset in part by information to the market from underwriting 
offerings.  Junior issuers seek underwriting as a means to attract market confidence in their 
offering. Underwriters provide considerable information to the market about the issuer for 
both reputational and regulatory certification reasons, whether under “best efforts” or “firm 
commitment” underwriting arrangements.30  The role of external market information must 
be assessed in conjunction with regulatory oversight in considering investor protection in 
any proportionate system.  
 
Proportionate disclosure should be based on what is relevant to investors. For example, 
investors in start up and junior companies may attach considerable importance to the record 
of management, the track record of finding the resource or mineral sought, in building 
equity, in securing mineral rights or licences, probable reserves, or intellectual property 
rights in the case of some sectors such as biotechnology.  These indicia of potential return 
may be more important to investors than extensive disclosures on governance controls.  
While financial statements are critically important aspects of continuous disclosure, they 
could be more targeted for junior issuers, in terms of what needs to be assessed by market 
participants, fostering greater confidence in the market. 
 
The issue of proportionate regulation also engages the question of market competitiveness.  
As the discussion of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the United Kingdom 
(UK) below indicates, issuers will be drawn to regulatory systems that are more responsive 
to their needs and which do not impose regulatory requirements that do not advance goals 
of investor protection or efficient markets.  There is a balance that needs to be achieved 
between the cost of regulation and its benefits to all market participants. 
 
                                                     
26
 Study cited in Adam Pritchard, “Well-Know Seasoned Issuers in Canada”, Research Study for the Task 
Force to Modernize Securities Legislation, May, 2006 at 17. 
27
 Firms with $345 to $800 million market cap had an average of 3.5 analysts per issuer. Adam Pritchard, 
“Well-Know Seasoned Issuers in Canada”, ibid. at 7. 
28
 Along with two other factors, trading volume and institutional ownership, Securities Offering Reform, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, July 19, 2005, at 35. 
29
 Pritchard observes that the higher level of analyst coverage for firms making offerings should be 
interpreted with caution as firms may provide such coverage in an effort to attract underwriting business, 
supra, note 26 at 19. 
30
 M. Condon, A. Anand and J. Sarra, Securities Regulation in Canada, (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 
2005). 
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(b)  Regulatory Oversight and Proportionate Regulation 
 
The options for the oversight of a proportionate regulation system offer different 
advantages and disadvantages, although design and implementation of proportionate 
regulation is equally feasible for a passport securities regime, a passport system with a 
common adjudicative scheme, or a common securities regulator.  Proportionate regulation 
requires national cooperation if it is to be uniformly applied.  Otherwise standards would be 
too fragmented and create prohibitive cost barriers to raising capital in more than one 
jurisdiction.  It would also lack the requisite transparency and certainty for investors and 
other market participants, in that different regional standards would mask the contours of 
risk and protection to investors.   
 
Without analyzing the merits of any of the regulatory oversight options, as that complex 
and important issue is well beyond the scope of this paper, there are some considerations 
that can briefly be set out in terms of thinking about issues that may arise with the different 
proposed models. 
 
Passport System 
 
Under the passport system, all Canadian regulators, except Ontario, have agreed that one 
securities regulatory authority acts as the principal regulator for all materials relating to a 
filer.31  All jurisdictions have agreed to cooperate under National Policy 11-202, Process 
for Prospectus Reviews in Multiple Jurisdictions, effective March 2008, which sets out the 
means by which an issuer can enjoy the benefits of co-ordinated review by the principal 
regulator and Ontario regulator in filing and receipting of prospectuses.32  The system 
marks a new level of coordination among securities regulators and offers the potential for 
further negotiation of national instruments and policies that would consider proportionate 
regulation.33  The advantage of the passport system for proportionate regulation is that any 
further recognition of scaled requirements through this system would be highly sensitive to 
differences in regional capital markets.  The process of negotiation among different 
regulators has to date allowed for considerable public policy debate on the impact of 
proposed standards on particular types of issuers, investors and the market more generally. 
Any further development towards proportionate regulation would benefit from this broad 
based consultative input.   
 
The disadvantage of the passport system in terms of moving toward greater proportionate 
regulation is the time and cost of building consensus on regulatory changes that may be 
required. The question is whether that time and cost is merited because the outcome in 
respect of how proportionate regulation is implemented is more sensitive to regional 
market differences.  There is also the challenge of different regulators interpreting and 
                                                     
31
 NI 41-101 expressly recognizes the passport system, creating a “passport prospectus” and a “dual 
prospectus”, where issuers are seeking to distribute in more than one Canadian jurisdiction. National Policy 
11-202 Process for Prospectus Reviews in Multiple Jurisdictions, effective March 17, 2008, describes the 
process for filing and review of prospectuses, including investment fund and shelf prospectuses, amendments 
to prospectuses and related materials in multiple jurisdictions. 
32
 NI 11-202 Process for Prospectus Reviews in Multiple Jurisdictions. 
33
 Some examples of proportionate regulation in Canada are discussed in the next part of this paper. 
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enforcing nationally negotiated proportionate standards differently, although regulators in 
recent years have cooperated to a greater degree in their compliance and enforcement 
initiatives. 
 
Passport System with National Adjudication Structure 
 
A passport system with a national adjudication structure poses some of the same benefits 
and challenges in terms of negotiating principles or standards for proportionate regulation, 
although once a principle or standard is established and affirmed by a national adjudicative 
tribunal, it would be uniformly applied by the regulators across Canada. The principal 
advantage is in having the benefit of carefully negotiated regulation, as discussed for the 
passport system, and then having one interpretation of national instruments, legislation and 
other rules that create special requirements for junior issuers. Such an option could increase 
fairness and lower transaction costs for small or junior issuers because there would likely 
be clear and consistent adjudicative guidance on what standards mean in practice, which 
does not necessarily occur under the passport system.   
 
The negative feature of proportionate regulation under this second model may be the 
adjustment costs as regulators amend or shift their local policy and compliance structures 
and norms to meet with any national adjudicative body’s substantive ruling in respect of a 
small or junior issuer requirement, a challenge not only confined to the issue of 
proportionate regulation.  
 
         Common Securities Regulator 
 
A common securities regulator would possibly allow for greater ease of policy change, 
allowing for more timely decision making in respect of regulatory change more generally 
and proportionate regulation more specifically, a significant advantage, assuming that there 
are processes in place for meaningful participation based on region and type of market 
participant.  Smaller issuers and other market participants could potentially have more 
timely and cost effective interactions with regulators, as they would deal with only one 
jurisdiction and pay one set of regulatory fees, although considerably more resources would 
be needed to effectively serve smaller market participants on a national basis.34 As with the 
common adjudicative option, the interpretation of proportionate regulation could be more 
consistent and fair across the country, advancing the goals of investor protection and 
market efficiency.   
 
However, a common securities regulatory system may be less sensitive to regional 
difference, and in particular, the regulatory compliance needs of junior issuers that are not 
located in Ontario, where many national regulatory bodies tend to be located.  Under such a 
system, regional enforcement centres would not necessarily be the solution if there was not 
meaningful regional input by the public and regulatory authorities into policy choices 
regarding compliance.   
 
                                                     
34
 The issue of the amount of fees that would be required to sustain a national system sensitive to regional 
needs is beyond the scope of this paper, but is an important question. 
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Key considerations for proportionate regulation in a common regulator system would be 
that there is a decision making mechanism that assesses the need for, and possible options 
for, modified regulation that is sensitive to differences in regional markets by size and 
sector; that the system create the resources and structure to allow small or junior issuers to 
be involved in a meaningful way in such policy and regulatory development; that the 
common adjudicative function be designed to ensure sensitivity to type and sector of junior 
and small issuers; and that any new proportionate regulation be monitored for its 
effectiveness or outcomes as measured against the rationale for the differentiated standard. 
 
Market Competition/Hybrid Model 
 
A hybrid of a passport system and common securities regulator is another possibility, 
similar to corporate law, where companies have the option of incorporating under the 
Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) or any provincial or territorial corporate law. 
Provinces design their corporate law to attract companies, such as unlimited liability 
companies in Nova Scotia or companies with par value shares in British Columbia.  While 
provincial corporate law has extraterritorial provisions to facilitate companies moving or 
undertaking arrangements or other capital structure changes that engage more than one 
province or territory, companies can opt to register under the CBCA for federal coverage 
and one set of rules, wherever they operate.  This dual structure has arguably created a 
market for incorporation in Canada.   
 
Considering only the issue of proportionate regulation under a dual securities law structure, 
a common regulator could continue to develop proportionate regulation on a national basis, 
in a timely fashion, having regard for regional needs and input as discussed above.35  While 
national buy-in of all jurisdictions would be the goal of any new regulatory principles or 
standards for junior issuers, all issuers would have the potential to immediately opt into a 
proportionate regulation system by registering with the common regulator.  In essence, 
there would be a market for registration, as issuers could list with the common regulator or 
with a passport provincial jurisdiction.  
 
While the contours of such a hybrid approach are beyond the scope of this discussion, the 
common regulator with a clearly proportionate regulatory regime could provide a market 
alternative for issuers and their advisors.  The issuer would not face fragmentation in 
requirements; and there would be a high degree of transparency in a single set of scaled 
requirements. The same considerations in respect of access to regulatory decision making, 
sensitivity to regional diversity, and monitoring for effectiveness would apply to this 
approach, as noted above.36  
 
 
 
                                                     
35
 Under such a system, provincial or territorial regulators could opt to authorize the common regulator to 
undertake all regulation and oversight in their jurisdiction, thus becoming part of a national regulatory 
system, or could opt to carry on as a regulator under the passport system.  
36
 If the common regulator were to adopt a principles or outcomes based approach, there would be a further 
aspect of a market for securities regulation created and different considerations would apply, as discussed 
below. 
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National Enforcement Approach 
 
A fourth option being considered is a national enforcement agency.  This option is harder 
to speculate on with respect to considerations for proportionate regulation as the idea 
appears to separate the policy and oversight function of securities regulators from the 
enforcement and adjudicative function, which seems counter intuitive from both a need to 
ensure that the range of regulatory tools – communication of principles and policies, setting 
of standards, guidance, problem solving, and compliance warnings - are compatible with 
enforcement, the latter of which really only becomes important when earlier parts of the 
system do not work.  In terms of junior issuers, who may be more in need of those earlier 
tools, any disconnect between regulatory oversight and enforcement could be extremely 
costly and, in some cases, could affect the financial viability of the junior issuer. Regulators 
in Canada currently tend to focus on different aspects of regulatory requirements in their 
enforcement activities,37 and it is not clear as to whether these regional differences are a 
function of particular regional conduct or enforcement preferences of particular regulators. 
Absent a clearer understanding of these dynamics and the pattern along the continuum of 
information, guidance, compliance and enforcement, it is difficult to assess the potential 
issues associated with proportionate regulation and this model.    
 
In summary, the passport system, the national adjudicative model, the common regulator 
model and the hybrid approach all offer some positive potential for proportionate 
regulation, but each also pose challenges in considering how policy choices would be made 
and implemented.  If layered with principles-based regulation, the challenges could be 
more complex if practice develops regionally in terms of meeting broad principles and 
standards and is adjudicated nationally. 
 
(c)   Principles/Standards/Outcomes Based Approaches and Proportionate Regulation 
 
Proportionate regulation as a policy option requires consideration of the interplay between 
a rules-based and a principles-based regulatory regime.  In reality, Canada, as many 
jurisdictions, is moving to an amalgam of these concepts, redefining rules as “standards” or 
“outcomes-based regulation” and informing them through articulated principles.38  This 
debate is the subject of another paper for the Expert Panel, and beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 
However, it merits note that if Canada is to shift further towards a principles/ 
standards/outcomes-based system, then it is necessary to examine the implications for 
                                                     
37
 Mary Condon, The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Orders by Securities Regulators in Canada, 
research paper for the Wise Persons Committee, 2003. 
38
 See for example, Ontario Securities Commission, Annual Report 2007,  
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/AnnualRpt/2008/goal1.html; CSA, Principles and Practices for the Sale of  
Products and Services in the Financial Sector;  
http://search.osc.gov.on.ca/en/query.html?col=osc&qt=+principles&charset=iso-8859-  
1&ql=&rf=1&Search.x=5&Search.y=3; IDA, Establishment and Amendment of IDA Rules to Implement the 
Core Principles of the Client Relationship Model, 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/MarketRegulation/SRO/ida/rr/srr-ida_20080229_amd-client-relation.pdf . See also, 
as an example, the discussion of proposed NI 31-103, below in this part. 
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proportionate regulation.  The premise of such a system is that regulators should intervene 
in the market only where necessary and only to the extent to remedy a market problem in a 
fair and cost efficient way that reduces risk to the integrity of the market.39  Such a system 
could recognize the barriers faced by junior issuers and the need to appropriately scale 
compliance requirements to reflect both their resources and the assurances sought by their 
investors.   
 
The UK sets broad principles with guidance on compliance and standards where necessary, 
measuring the value of regulatory intervention by assessing outcomes and milestones, the 
cost effectiveness of regulation, and the effectiveness of enforcement.40  The FSA’s high 
level principles of business conduct focus on skill, care, diligence, risk management, 
financial resources, fair treatment of investors and market conduct.41  The FSA’s approach 
is that a regulator should only intervene in markets where the market is failing to deliver 
acceptable outcomes, and where the costs of intervention are justified by the benefits to be 
delivered by regulation.   
 
Endorsing a similar approach, the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) has 
used the term “outcomes-based regulation”, which uses both principles-based and 
prescriptive rules in conjunction with other regulatory tools such as compliance 
monitoring, guidance, education and enforcement, with the goal of eventually reducing the 
emphasis on prescriptive rules.42  It believes that risk-based regulation is a critical 
component of outcomes-based regulation, not a separate regulatory goal and that regulators 
should only intervene where the sole means to address a problem is regulation to 
effectively remedy the problem.43   
 
British Columbia’s 2004 proposed legislation is the best example of its outcomes-based 
approach, expressly enshrining its principles and outcomes based approach in the statute.44  
                                                     
39
 BCSC, supra, note 24 at 2. 
40
 The FSA mandate under the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is to promote efficient, orderly 
and fair markets; help retail consumers achieve a fair deal; and improve business capability and effectiveness. 
FSA Handbook,  http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/Glossary/S, last accessed July 20, 2008. 
41
 The FSA has set 11 high level principles, in place since 2001: 1. A firm must conduct its business with 
integrity. 2. A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence. 3. A firm must take 
reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management 
systems. 4. A firm must maintain adequate financial resources. 5. A firm must observe proper standards of 
market conduct. 6. A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. 7. A firm 
must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way 
which is clear, fair and not misleading. 8. A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself 
and its customers and between a customer and another client. 9. A firm must take reasonable care to ensure 
the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its 
judgement. 10. A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients’ assets when it is responsible for them. 11. 
A firm must deal with its regulators in an open co-operative way, and must disclose to the FSA appropriately 
anything relating to the firm of which the FSA would reasonably expect notice; FSA, “Principles-based 
regulation – Focusing on the Outcomes that Matter,” FSA Paper, April 2007, online: 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/small_firms/general/pbr/index.shtml, last accessed July 28, 2008. 
42
 BCSC, supra, note 24 at 2, 6. 
43
 Ibid. at 5. 
44
 British Columbia Bill 38, 2004 Securities Act, not in force, http://www.leg.bc.ca/37th5th/3rd_read/gov38-
3.htm. 
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While it placed its proposed legislation on hold in the interests of trying to make the 
passport system work, the BCSC carries out its oversight, enforcement and policy activities 
based on an outcomes-based approach. For example, the BCSC’s Service Plan 2008-2011 
sets out broad principles and goals, such as promoting a culture of compliance and cost-
effective regulation, and then measures each of its initiatives against those goals.45 
Regulatory intervention is viewed as needed only occasionally to correct non-compliance, 
and the Commission’s administrative activities are directed towards supporting issuers in 
their efforts to put in place effective controls and systems.46  The BCSC considers the 
impact of administrative initiatives on issuers of different sizes.  While its enforcement 
strategy is to be rigorous, in administering the statute, the BCSC takes account of what 
issuers are trying to accomplish, assessing whether an issuer is achieving the underlying 
objectives of particular requirements.47  If issuers are being duly diligent in their efforts to 
meet regulatory requirements, the BCSC`s compliance examination team will be flexible in 
how it works with them to improve an aspect of their conduct.  The BCSC applies a 
scorecard to each regulatory decision; and it tracks outcomes in response to market 
problems, giving credit for outcomes-focused results.48 In the BCSC’s reporting of 
activities, it sets out its goals and performance measurements by specific objectives and the 
annual targets for each year.49  
 
In terms of BCSC’s approach to policy development through its work with the CSA, its 
express goal is to advance cost-effective regulation, emphasizing practical solutions in 
terms of a range of regulatory responses, not simply further codification.50 An example is 
proposed National Instrument 31-103, Registration Requirements, which is, in part, 
principles and outcomes based.51  The proposed business conduct rules set out what issuers 
must achieve, setting a broad requirement to provide a relationship disclosure document to 
clients, with a principles-based provision requiring registrants to provide information that a 
reasonable client would consider important.52 Compliance examiners will have to assess 
outcomes as opposed to measuring issuers against a prescribed list.53 Other parts of the 
proposed instrument, such as compliance system requirements and complaints provisions 
establish broad principles and standards, and will be measured based on the system 
established and its outcomes.54 
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 BCSC Service Plan 2008-2011, supra, note 24 at 7-8. 
46
 Ibid. at 9. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. at 20. 
49
 Ibid. at 17-20. 
50
 Ibid. at 14. 
51
 CSA, Proposed National Instrument 31-103, Registration Requirements, February 29, 2008. 
52
 Ibid., part 5, Conduct Rules, and  NI 31-103 Notice and Request for Comments, February 29, 2008 at 11. 
53
 CSA, Proposed National Instrument 31-103, Registration Requirements, supra, note 51, section 5.15. 
54
 Ibid., sections 5.23 and 5.28. Section 5.23 specifies “(1) A registered firm must establish, maintain and 
apply a system of controls and supervision sufficient to (a) provide reasonable assurance that the firm and 
each individual acting on its behalf complies with securities legislation, and (b) manage the risks associated 
with its business in conformity with prudent business practices. (2) The system of controls referred to in 
subsection (1) must be documented in the form of written policies and procedures. Section 5.28 specifies 
“5.28 A registered firm must document, and effectively and fairly respond to, each complaint made to the 
registered firm about any product or service offered by the firm or a representative of the firm”. 
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Under a principles/standards/outcomes-based system, tools for compliance are tailored to 
specific outcomes; so, arguably, there is no need for bright line, size-based regulation.  
Under this model, regulators work with market participants to identify broad principles and 
then the content of those principles is developed through implementation and practice. 
Principles would appear to be important to set universally, regardless of size or type of 
issuer. Ideally, then, the design of regulatory standards or the development of issuer 
practice to meet those principles could be scalable, thus working effectively for all sizes 
and/or types of issuers.  To the extent that junior issuers cannot fit within one universal 
standard and proportionate requirements are implemented, they would need to fit the 
criteria of transparency, certainty and scalability discussed above.  In this sense, regulation 
could be tailored to junior issuers in particular sectors or markets and could avoid the 
bright-line delineation problems discussed below.  
 
Proportionate regulation under such a regulatory model raises the issue of whether junior 
issuers have the appropriate resources or capacity to develop appropriate regulatory 
practices, in the absence of tools or guidance from regulators.  On the one hand, the 
governance and compliance resources of junior issuers may be directed more effectively; 
on the other hand, junior issuers may not have the internal expertise or the financial 
resources to hire the expertise to design governance and control practices that achieve the 
express regulatory principles and are responsive to the market in which they participate. 
Broad practice norms evolving from principles applied on the ground need to be sensitive 
to these limitations faced by junior issuers.  Given that senior issuers have greater internal 
expertise and resources, their practice in a particular governance or control area could 
become the accepted compliance norm or threshold, creating further barriers to junior 
issuer compliance.   
 
An important consideration for principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation is that, 
while junior issuers may want less regulation, they also frequently want transparency and 
clarity in standards or guidance, so that they can meet the requirements in a cost effective 
manner.55  There may be unnecessary costs incurred where requirements are not clear, as 
junior issuers may incur the costs of additional professional opinions where they are 
uncertain.  This issue is particular worth considering with the introduction of secondary 
market civil liability in a number of jurisdictions, in terms of officers’ fear of not “getting it 
right”, notwithstanding their best intentions.  
 
Thus, consideration of principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation on a proportionate 
basis must engage those that are affected, creating opportunities for their participation in 
policy discussion, guidance and tools for practice.  Expectations must be clear, accessible 
and relevant, based on the outcomes sought that have been articulated as public policy 
goals.  There must be meaningful participation by junior issuers and market participants to 
improve the quality of decision making that is aimed at scaling regulation.56  
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 The CSA promulgated forms under national instruments are a good example of regulators being clear on 
what their expectation is for filing or disclosure. 
56
 Julia Black, “Involving Consumers in Securities Regulation”, in Canada Steps Up, Final Report of the IDA 
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada (2006), Volume 6 at 543, 
http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(9)%20Black.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2008, citing education, information, 
consultation and participation as the four main components of investor participation in the regulatory process. 
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An example of mixed proportionate and principles based regulation is the AIM in the UK.57 
As an exchange-regulated market, AIM is only indirectly supervised by the UK financial 
sector regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), with regulatory oversight by the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE).58  A junior market, AIM has a regulatory system that is 
specifically tailored to the needs of small, growing companies, providing a set of less 
prescriptive rules. Its hallmark of differentiated regulation by type of listing are the 
Nominated Advisers (Nomads), which are investment bankers, brokers or accounting firms 
that are responsible to both the companies they are advising and to the LSE for ensuring the 
integrity of the market.59  Their oversight, for both entry and meeting ongoing compliance, 
serves a functional alternative to prescriptive rules, but means that there is a fair degree of 
oversight of junior issuer activity.  
 
In practice, proportionate regulation on AIM has meant that, in some cases, there is no 
scaled regulation and in others there is. The criteria for being admitted to AIM are less 
restrictive.60  The regulation of corporate governance is less prescriptive than for 
companies listed on the Main Market. Companies on the Main Market are under a ”comply 
or explain” obligation with respect to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance; AIM 
companies simply have to have appropriate corporate governance structures. However, 
Nomads are required to work with directors to ensure adoption of appropriate corporate 
governance measures that accord with the principles of existing codes.61  AIM’s rationale 
for proportionate requirements is that young, growth companies should not be impeded by 
unnecessarily rigid or inappropriate restrictions on their internal operations; rather, investor 
protection is met by Nomads ensuring that the company acts appropriately, coupled with 
enhanced disclosure to investors through new AIM Rules for Companies, effective 
February 2007.62  Companies admitted to AIM are subject to the same ongoing obligations 
for disclosure and transaction reporting that apply to the Main Market, though there are 
some differences.  Investors are warned in disclosures that due to its less prescriptive 
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 Companies admitted to trading on AIM are UK companies, foreign companies, UK registered holding 
companies, particularly in the oil, gas and mining sectors, and closed-end property and investment funds. 
58
 Sridhar Arcot, Julia Black and Geoffrey Owen, From Local to Global, The Rise of AIM as a Stock Market 
for Growing Companies, September 2007, www.londonstockexchange.com/aim. Under provisions of EU law 
implemented November 2007, AIM’s regulatory status changed to being a multi-lateral trading facility 
operated by the Exchange, ibid. at 9. 
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 Ibid. at 12. There are currently 76 registered Nomads, although 30 Nomads are appointed to around 80 per 
cent of AIM companies. In 2006, AIM introduced new Rules for Nomads in order to emphasize and clarify 
their obligations; AIM Rules for Nominated Advisors (RN). To become a Nomad, both firms and individuals 
within the firm must meet specific requirements as to experience and qualifications, and must be independent 
from the issuer. Independence is defined in RN r.21 and Schedule 1. The overriding principle is whether the 
firm or its qualified executives ‘might endanger the reputation and integrity of AIM’. 
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 For example, there are no minimum capital requirements and no requirement for the company to have been 
trading for three years prior to admission, although the requirement for three years’ of audited accounts for 
companies that have been trading is the same as for the Main Market; AIM Notice 24 (October 2006) and 
introduced in Notice 27 (February 2007) available at www.londonstockexchange.com/en-
gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/For+AIM+Advisers/aimnotices.htm. 
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 Ibid. AIM RN r.18, Sched 3 AR2. 
62
 Ibid. at 22. The regulation over the LSE, and thus AIM, changed significantly in 2006 and 2007, partly to 
meet changes in EU law, notably the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). 
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regulation, investing in AIM companies is more risky than investing in equities listed on 
the Main Market.63   
 
With respect to the FSA’s direct regulatory oversight (primarily investment firms), it uses a 
risk-based approach. The system is evolving, in that rules continue to exist as the FSA 
moves to a more principles-based approach to regulation, but as firms interpret principles, 
they can be exempt from compliance with the rules if they can demonstrate that their 
practice is achieving the public policy principle. The FSA uses different methodology for 
assessing small firm outcomes.64 While its model is not directly applicable to Canada in 
that the 18,000 small firms that the FSA oversees are largely investment firms with 
considerably more market expertise than Canadian junior issuers, it nevertheless illustrates 
some broad policy choices.65 The FSA approach is that regulation should be proportionate, 
risk-based, evidence-based, and properly designed so that they achieve specified 
outcomes.66  On this basis, the FSA directs less regulatory energy or resources to small 
firms because they are of comparatively lower risk to investors and the market. The FSA 
articulates principles, such as duty of care towards customers, and then uses a number of 
tools to identify firms most at risk of non-compliance and to minimize incentives small 
firms may have to be non-complaint, with a mix of communication, education, supervision 
and enforcement, setting key milestones for small retail firms.67  Its aim is a “rigorous 
regulatory environment for UK financial services, but with more effective regulation and 
“outcome focused rules”.68   Its focus is on “sign posts” or guidance on controls.  For 
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example, it currently has embarked on a three-year enhanced strategy aimed at helping 
small firms achieve its policy goal of “Treating Customers Fairly”.  By December 2008, 
firms must: demonstrate that senior management have instilled a culture within the firm 
regarding fair treatment of customers, and how errors are promptly found and remedied. 
They must demonstrate that they have implemented appropriate and accurate measuring of 
performance against customer fairness issues materially relevant to their business.69  The 
FSA reports that it takes tough enforcement action by focusing on and dealing more visibly 
with a targeted group of firms that are failing to deliver fair treatment of customers.70  
Education is an important part of the FSA’s small firm strategy, with interactive roadshows 
linked to its regional assessment program and case studies as models of good practice.71 
 
The FSA’s approach to proportionate regulation has several hallmarks.  Its approach is to 
set broad principles that it wants to achieve, and then impose standards or milestones.  It 
dedicates fewer regulatory resources to small firms based on risk assessment.  It exempts 
firms from regulatory compliance based on their practice, rather than blanket exemptions 
based on size of issuer.  In the Canadian context, such an approach may mean assessing 
each new policy instrument to assess what the policy objective is and whether a proposed 
standard for junior issuers does anything to advance that objective, based on risks to 
investors and risk to market competitiveness. Given the number of junior issuers in the 
Canadian market, allocation of education, compliance and enforcement resources would 
have to recognize the size and materiality of the junior market and recognize that such 
issuers may pose a lower risk to regulatory misconduct.  Moreover, the expertise of the 
investment firms to which the FSA’s approach applies may be more sophisticated in terms 
of its ability to set milestones, and the experience, while informative, may not be directly 
responsive to challenges faced by junior issuers in public equity markets. 
 
A principles/standards/outcomes based regulatory approach should be accompanied by 
rigorous enforcement of securities law and regulation.  Fewer and less prescriptive rules 
should not mean less rigorous enforcement.  Canadian securities regulators already engage 
in risk-based assessment and enforcement; specifically, they adopt differing levels of 
scrutiny based on risk, materiality and proportionality.  However, principles/standards/ 
outcomes based regulatory approach might mean that regulators use a range of tools, as the 
FSA has, in finding solutions to an identified market problem or stated goal, including 
guidance, education, public participation in setting expectations, monitoring and 
enforcement. Such an approach may treat junior issuers differently, depending on the issue, 
but the driver of policy choice is what is most effective and cost efficient as opposed to 
regulation by type of issuer. 
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The BCSC has previously suggested that a properly designed outcomes-based regime will 
provide sensible outcomes for all market participants without having to devise separate 
regimes.72  It observed that disadvantages include the difficulty in getting the correct 
thresholds between classes of issuers and that “even if it works most of the time, the regime 
spins off a welter of exemption applications as issuers who should be in one category find 
themselves in a different one.”  It was also concerned that there is a risk that issuers 
regulated in the less rigorous categories would be seen as less desirable investments.  Its 
view is that less regulation, if replaced by outcomes-based requirements, properly 
implemented and supervised by the regulator, actually increases investor protection.73  
 
Risk-based enforcement systems are essentially the end-part of a proportionate regulation 
system, in that choices are made in respect of the highest priorities for monitoring and 
enforcement.  How these choices interact with front-end regulatory and disclosure 
requirements has an impact on the overall efficacy and fairness of the regulatory regime.  If 
standards or expectations are not clear, principles-based systems can offer challenges for 
junior issuers, who want clarity in what is expected of them.   
 
(d) Cross-Border Harmonization 
 
Another consideration for proportionate regulation is continued access to US and other 
international markets. Since 1990, the SEC and Canada’s securities regulators have 
participated in the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System that permits issuers in the US 
and Canada to more easily access each other’s markets.  Currently, the SEC and Canadian 
securities regulators are in discussions for a potential US-Canada mutual recognition 
arrangement.74  Harmonization with the US is unlikely given the different structure of the 
respective capital markets and different normative views of the extent of rules needed. 
Mutual recognition is more feasible, whereby regulators rely on their counterparts in other 
countries where two systems have comparable goals.  Under mutual recognition, US 
exchanges would be able to operate in Canada under US rules and regulations, and 
Canadian exchanges would be able to operate in the US under Canadian rules, regulation 
and oversight.75  
 
The purpose of “free trade” in securities is to lower costs through the efficiencies that are 
realized in the reduction of dual regulation and regulatory overlap, resulting in increased 
liquidity, better valuations and more dynamic markets.76  Another aspect of mutual 
recognition is the move by Canada to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS); 
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the US proposes to allow foreign companies in the US to use IFRS without requiring 
reconciliation with US GAAP.77  The pursuit of mutual recognition is unlikely to be 
harmed by the continued introduction of proportionate regulation as many Canadian issuers 
are within the US definition of small cap. 
 
 
5.  Delineating Issuers for Regulatory Purposes 
 
The second policy question is whether size, type of exchange listing, or some other 
criterion should be the determinant of how proportionate regulation is structured.  A 
critically important policy question is how to delineate which issuers fall within a category 
of issuers that are entitled to different regulatory treatment.78  The distinctions may involve 
different standards of disclosure or other compliance, or outright exemption from some 
regulatory requirements for particular specified issuers.  Here again, principles of 
transparency, fairness and certainty underlay any policy choices. 
 
The delineation could be by market type of exchange on which issuers are listed; by 
capitalization; by revenue; or some combination.   
 
(a)  Type of Listing Approach  
 
One option is to scale regulatory requirements based on the type of exchange that the issuer 
is listed on.  In Canada, that distinction has been made based on listing with the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSX) or comparable exchange, such as the NYSE, versus listing on the 
TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV) or similar exchange, such as the AIM.  Under several 
national instruments, venture issuer is defined as: “a reporting issuer that, as at the 
applicable time, did not have any of its securities listed or quoted on any of the Toronto 
Stock Exchange, a U.S. marketplace, or a marketplace outside of Canada and the United 
States of America other than the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock 
Exchange or the PLUS markets operated by PLUS Markets Group plc”.79  Thus, the 
distinction for purposes of proportionate regulation is venture issuer in the junior market 
versus non-venture issuer in the senior market, rather than distinguishing based on size. 
 
The TMX Group has characterized the distinct nature of the TSXV in the following way: 
 
The TSX Venture market is unique in its own right.  It has had a long history of 
small issuers successfully raising small amounts of public capital at an earlier 
stage than senior market issuers.  These are higher risk enterprises, both in terms 
of business risk but also in terms of the absence of classical internal controls, 
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such as segregation of duties.  While there are compensating controls such as 
management supervisory controls, shareholders know and accept that those 
controls are thoroughly dependent on trust in officer and director integrity and 
tone at the top.  This market has its own listing, corporate governance and other 
requirements that are tailored to emerging companies.  This market is branded 
separately from the senior market, which among other things, provides a bright-
line notice to investors of the distinct and higher risk profile of this market. … 
The corporate governance and financial reporting securities law requirements 
that apply to TSX Venture listed issuers are more robust than similar 
requirements that apply to issuers on AIM or ASX.  Generally, TSX Venture 
issuers must comply with more stringent requirements covering, among other 
things, audit committee composition, including independence and financial 
literacy requirements and quarterly financial reporting requirements.80 
 
The TSXV monitors listed issuers on an ongoing basis, and if they fall below its ongoing 
listing standards, the issuers are moved to a separate trading board of the TSXV, the 
NEX.81  Industry participants are thus alerted to the higher risk profile of the issuer, 
pending efforts by the issuer to refinance, restructure, reactivate, engage in a reverse 
takeover, or other measures to eventually graduate to TSXV.  NEX issuers must re-apply to 
TSXV and provide evidence of their compliance with TSXV listing requirements.82  
 
Venture issuers are also monitored for compliance by the Investment Industry Regulatory 
Organization of Canada (IIROC).  IIROC monitors trading activity on the TSXV and other 
marketplaces in Canada and enforces non-compliance with universal market integrity rules, 
including imposing trading halts, administering and monitoring compliance with TSXV 
policies on timely disclosure requirements, unacceptable trading practices, suspected 
breaches of TSXV trading activity, take-over, substantial issuer and normal course issuer 
bids, and other requirements.83  The objective is independent, timely and effective 
enforcement to advance investor protection and market integrity. 
 
Thus, junior issuers on the TSXV pose higher risk, but not from the lack of regulatory 
scrutiny; rather, because of the inherently developmental nature of many of the activities of 
these issuers.   
   
The advantage of a listing approach to distinguishing issuers for purposes of proportionate 
regulation is its transparency for investors and ease of monitoring.  For example, there are 
different kinds of compliance requirements depending on whether the issuer is listed on the 
TSX or the TSXV, and depending on the type of issuer, such as capital pool companies or 
venture issuers.  Such a bifurcation recognizes the stage of development of the firm and the 
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challenges for junior companies.84  Differences in regulation are independent of the issuer’s 
size or market capitalization, but rather, dependent on the location of its listing.  A 
principal reason that the TSX and regulators have distinguished requirements is their 
recognition that junior issuers often lack the resources or in-house expertise to which larger 
corporations have access.   
 
Canadian securities regulators have already recognized some measure of proportionate 
regulation in their national instruments based on the type of listing.  Three examples are 
illustrative: corporate governance disclosure; continuous disclosure requirements; and the 
proposed new officer certification national instrument. 
 
(i)  Corporate Governance Disclosure 
 
Pursuant to NI 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, there is 
proportionate regulation in respect of the amount of disclosure required from non-venture 
and venture issuers.85  For example, while both types of issuers are to disclose the identity 
of independent and non-independent directors, and describe the basis for that 
determination, the requirements for non-venture issuers are considerably more detailed.86 
Non-venture issuers must disclose board attendance records; and the identity, role and 
responsibilities of the independent chair or lead director, or, if the board does not have one, 
how it provides leadership for its independent directors.87  Non-venture issuers must 
describe what the board of directors does to facilitate its exercise of independent judgment 
in carrying out its responsibilities if a majority of directors are not independent; disclose 
whether or not independent directors hold regularly scheduled in-camera meetings, 
including particulars on the number of meetings and what the board does to facilitate 
candid discussion.  Venture issuers do not face such requirements.  Venture issuers are also 
not required to disclose the board's written mandate or delineation of board roles and 
responsibilities; nor required to disclose written position descriptions or delineated roles for 
the board chair and chair of each board committee, whereas senior issuers are.88  All 
reporting issuers must disclose director orientation and continuing education initiatives, but 
only non-venture issuers must describe how the board ensures that its directors maintain the 
skill and knowledge necessary to meet their obligations as directors.89  
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While venture issuers must disclose what steps, if any, the board takes to encourage and 
promote a culture of ethical business conduct,90 non-venture issuers must provide 
considerably more detailed disclosure, including adoption and monitoring of a written code 
of conduct; providing cross-references to any material change report that pertains to 
conduct of a director or executive officer that constitutes a departure from the code; and 
any steps the board takes to ensure directors exercise independent judgment in considering 
transactions where a director or executive officer has a material interest.91  While both 
types of issuers must describe how the board satisfies itself that the board and individual 
directors are performing effectively, non-venture issuers must describe the process used for 
director and board assessments.92  Similarly, disclosures in respect of nomination and 
compensation of directors are more detailed for non-venture issuers than venture issuers.93  
 
Hence, in respect of corporate governance disclosures, proportionate regulation involves 
modified requirements in scope, breadth and detail of required corporate disclosure and 
systems.  Venture issuers must undertake the above-mentioned disclosures, but are not 
required to provide details.  Where a non-venture issuer board does not have formal 
policies and practices in place, it must disclose initiatives that it has undertaken to ensure 
independence and objectivity in the process.  In a sense, therefore, NI 58-101 has identified 
the key elements of corporate governance that must be disclosed, regardless of the type of 
listing or size or sophistication of the issuer.  Equally, however, it has recognized that 
relational management is a feature of many venture issuers, and while there are disclosure 
requirements in respect of the assurance of board effectiveness, there is no need for the 
venture issuer to measure itself against more codified best practices that are appropriate for 
senior issuers, which often require the establishment of systems and controls to encourage 
the integrity of business conduct. 
 
The initiatives of securities regulators have been adopted by the TMX Group, which has 
amended its corporate governance disclosure requirements to align with NI 58-101.94  The 
TSX is more generally revising its manual to align new regulatory requirements under 
national instruments with listing requirements. 
 
(ii)  Continuous Disclosure Obligations 
 
NI 51-102, Continuous Disclosure Obligations, is another example of proportionate 
regulation by type of listing, recognizing different requirements for venture and non-
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venture reporting issuers.95  Proportionate requirements include, most notably, different 
filing deadlines for annual and interim financial statements and specified exemptions from 
some disclosure requirements for junior and senior reporting issuers.  NI 51-102 specifies 
that non-venture issuers must file audited annual financial statements within 90 days after 
the end of its most recently completed financial year; venture issuers have 120 days.96  
Deadlines for filing interim financial statements are 45 days for non-venture issuers and 60 
days for venture issuers after the end of the interim period.97   
 
This modification of regulation through different reporting timelines, as a policy choice, 
can be compared with the AIM’s frequency of disclosure, where small issuers are required 
to give only annual and semi-annual financial statements.  Frequency is an option to 
consider, in that if investors are not reading quarterly results, it may be that junior issuers 
could be exempted.  However, any exemption can only be effective if the integrity of the 
issuer and the market were assured.  If it appears to investors that junior issuers are being 
downgraded in terms of oversight or compliance, then such a change will not meet the 
express goals of the regulatory system.  The issue is what periodic disclosure is really 
relevant to investors and potential investors and how frequently they want an update on that 
relevant information. 
 
Venture issuers in Canada are exempted from filing an AIF.98  Venture issuers are also 
exempted from specified disclosure requirements under NI 51-102, such as filing a report 
on matters submitted to a vote at a meeting of securityholders.99  Under liquidity 
disclosures, issuers are required to discuss balance sheet conditions or income or cash flow 
items in a summary and tabular form, but venture issuers do not have to provide the 
summary and table.100  Venture issuers do not have to provide an analysis of their critical 
accounting estimates as non-venture issuers do.101  Pursuant to Form 51-102F6, Statement 
of Executive Compensation, there are also different disclosure requirements in respect of 
stock appreciation rights (SAR), in that venture issues do not have to make a number of 
specified disclosures that non-venture issuers do.102  However, a venture issuer must 
disclose which grants of options or SARs result from repricing and explain in reasonable 
detail the basis for the repricing.103 
 
While all reporting issuers are required to file a business acquisition report (BAR) within 
75 days after the date of a significant acquisition, NI 51-102 sets different filing deadlines 
                                                     
95
 NI 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations, 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/rule_20080704_51-102_unofficial-cons-
ni.pdf, last accessed July 23, 2008. 
96
 “or the date of filing, in a foreign jurisdiction, annual financial statements for its most recently completed 
financial year”; ibid., s. 4.2.  
97
 “or the date of filing, in a foreign jurisdiction, interim financial statements”; ibid. s. 4.4. 
98
 6.1 Requirement to File an AIF, ibid. 
99
 NI 51-102, s. 11.3 Voting Results. 
100
 Form 51-102F1 Management’s Discussion & Analysis. 
101
 Ibid., 1.12 Critical Accounting Estimates. 
102
 A SAR is a right, granted by a company or any of its subsidiaries as compensation for employment 
services or office, to receive cash or an issue or transfer of securities based wholly or in part on changes in the 
trading price of publicly traded securities.   
103
 Form 51-102F6, Statement of Executive Compensation, Item 13 Venture Issuers. 
 31 
if the most recently completed financial year of the acquired business ended 45 days or less 
before the date of acquisition, in which case a reporting issuer must file a BAR within 90 
days after the date of acquisition, but a venture issuer has 120 days.104  There are also 
different tests for venture and non-venture issuers in respect of what is defined as a 
significant acquisition; specifically, the asset test, the investment test, or the income test, 
where 20 per cent is read as 40 per cent for venture issuers.105  
 
NI 51-102 also imposes increased disclosure requirements on venture issuers in at least one 
circumstance.  Venture issuers, without significant revenue in the prior two financial years, 
must disclosure in their MD&A capitalized or expensed exploration and development 
costs, expensed research and development costs, and deferred development costs.106  The 
objective is to focus venture issuers’ discussion and analysis of results of operations on 
expenditures and progress towards achieving business objectives and milestones.107  
Certain venture issuers must provide, in their annual or interim MD&A, a breakdown of 
material costs whether capitalized, deferred or expensed.108  
 
Within the type of listing approach, there is also a demarcation for particular issuers, such 
as capital pool companies.109  Regulators have an agreement with the TSXV, which is 
aimed at addressing barriers to early financing, allowing a capital pool company to list on 
the TSXV subject to specific conditions.110  It establishes a program under which a CPC 
may conduct an initial public offering by prospectus and obtain a listing on TSX Venture's 
Tier 2.  The program requires the CPC to identify and complete a Qualifying Transaction 
(QT) within a specified period of time after listing.111  The TSXV administers the CPC 
program and reviews the prospectuses and QT Circulars. The agreement with regulators 
sets out the standards that the TSXV will apply. 
 
Hence, this second example illustrates four types of proportionate regulation: exemption 
from particular disclosure requirements, scaled timing for compliance with periodic 
disclosure requirements, modified requirements in terms of details to be disclosed, and 
“tailored” requirements, such as MD&A exploration and development disclosure 
requirements for venture issuers without significant revenue in the prior two financial 
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years.112  The delineation by type of listing does not result in less rigorous requirements; 
rather, they are proportionate to the type of issuer, its capacity to make periodic disclosure 
on a timely basis, and more focussed in terms of being aimed at what the particular investor 
needs to know to make investment choices.  In this respect, disclosure requirements could 
focus more clearly on junior issuers.  Given the fact that many junior issuers do not 
generate much, if any, revenue, timely information such as drill results, clinical trial results, 
and approval of mineral licenses can be more important than financial statements in making 
investment decisions.113 
 
(iii)  Certification of Disclosure 
 
The third and most recent example of proportionate regulation in Canada is the proposed 
NI 52-109, Certification Disclosure in Issuer’s Annual and Interim Filings, expected to 
come into force effective December 15, 2008.114   Here, after earlier failed attempts to build 
national consensus on the scope of officer certification and whether Canada should adopt  
S-Ox 404 standards,115 the CSA has succeeded in finding a proportionate response to the 
need for some sort of assurances by senior officers without the expense of external auditor 
attestation.    
 
NI 52-109 requires an issuer’s chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer 
(CFO), or persons performing similar functions (certifying officers), to personally certify 
that the issuer’s annual and interim filings do not contain any misrepresentations; and that 
the financial statements and other financial information in the annual and interim filings 
fairly present the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer.  
They must also certify that they have designed or supervised the design of disclosure 
controls and procedures (DC&P) and internal control over financial reporting (ICFR); they 
have caused the issuer to disclose in its MD&A any change in the issuer’s ICFR that has 
materially affected the issuer’s ICFR; and, on an annual basis, that they have evaluated the 
effectiveness of the issuer’s DC&P and caused the issuer to disclose their conclusions in 
the issuer’s MD&A.  In anticipation of these changes, in November 2007, nine Canadian 
regulators issued blanket orders that had the effect of modifying the current certification 
requirements as they apply to venture issuers as set out in the Instrument.116  
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The most important aspect of proportionate regulation by type of listing in proposed NI 52-
109 is that the instrument creates a new form of certificate for junior issuers, a "venture 
issuer basic certificate," in which certifying officers of venture issuers are not required to 
include representations in their certificates relating to the establishment and maintenance of 
DC&P and ICFR; whereas non-venture issuers are required to use a control framework in 
the design of ICFR.117  The venture issuer basic certificate includes a note to investors and 
others reading the materials explaining how it differs from the full certificate required to be 
filed by reporting non-venture issuers.  A venture issuer filing a basic certificate is not 
required to discuss in its annual or interim MD&A the design or operating effectiveness of 
DC&P or ICFR.118  Venture issuers can still choose to file full certificates.  Hence, the 
venture issuer basic certificate meets the express objectives of securities law, in that it is 
transparent in terms of disclosures to investors and others as to how it differs from the full 
certificate.  It modifies the certification requirements to recognize the type of issuer and its 
limited resources, and to recognize what investors are seeking to know about financial 
controls in assessing potential risk and return.  It recognizes that those investing in venture 
issuers may wish their capital to be directed towards development and economic activity of 
the issuer, rather than governance or financial assurances, while still imposing a relatively 
high standard of assurances. 
 
Proposed NI 52-109 also requires that non-venture issuers use a control framework to 
design their ICFR, whereas venture issuers are not required.119  The CSA also suggested 
that smaller issuers can refer to Internal Control over Financial Reporting – Guidance for 
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Smaller Public Companies published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
(COSO), for guidance to smaller public companies on the implementation of the COSO 
Framework.120 This suggestion raises an important consideration in respect of the 
venture/non-venture issuer delineation.  There are a number of small issuers on the TSX 
that are subjected to the full regulatory requirements of NI 52-109.  If all issuers on the 
TSX or similar exchanges must comply with the more detailed requirements, such as 
control frameworks, regardless of capitalization, then it may be appropriate to provide 
greater guidance in respect of what such frameworks could entail, recognizing that there 
are different size issuers on the TSX.  Here again, there could be a proportionate approach 
in that smaller issuers listed on the TSX do not necessarily need the “Cadillac” version of 
control frameworks, given their governance and oversight structure.  Rather than a different 
regulatory standard, it could take the form of assistance in designing a range of control 
frameworks sensitive to size and sector. 
 
Proposed NI 52-109 also makes a distinction between non-venture issuers and venture 
issuers in terms of new requirements to report material weakness in internal controls. 
“Material weakness” means a deficiency or combination of deficiencies in ICFR such that 
there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the reporting issuer’s annual 
or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.121  If a 
non-venture issuer determines it has a material weakness that exists as at the end of the 
period covered by its annual or interim filings, it must disclose in its annual or interim 
MD&A a description of the material weakness; its impact on the issuer’s financial 
reporting and its ICFR; and the issuer’s plans or actions already undertaken for remediating 
the material weakness.  
 
A venture issuer is not required to file an AIF; however, if it voluntarily files an AIF, it 
must file a separate annual certificate signed by a certifying office on the same date that it 
files the AIF.122  Under the venture issuer basic certificate, the certifying officer must 
certify that he or she has reviewed the AIF, if any, annual financial statements and annual 
MD&A, including all documents and information that are incorporated by reference; and 
based on the officer’s  knowledge, having exercised reasonable diligence, certify that these 
annual filings do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a 
material fact required to be stated or that is necessary to make a statement not misleading in 
light of the circumstances under which it was made, for the period covered by the annual 
filings.123  The officer must also certify that based on his or her knowledge, having 
exercised reasonable diligence, the annual financial statements together with the other 
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financial information included in the annual filings fairly present in all material respects the 
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer.   
 
The proposed note to readers that will be required specifies that, in contrast to the 
certificate required for non-venture issuers under NI 52-109, the Venture Issuer Basic 
Certificate does not include representations relating to the establishment and maintenance 
of DC&P and ICFR, and the certifying officers filing the certificate are not making any 
representations relating to the establishment and maintenance of controls designed to 
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the 
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with the issuer’s 
GAAP.124  The explanatory note is to alert investors that limitations on the ability of 
certifying officers of a venture issuer to design and implement on a cost effective basis 
DC&P and ICFR may result in additional risks to the quality, reliability, transparency and 
timeliness of interim and annual filings and other reports provided under securities 
legislation.125  Certification of annual and interim filings following an initial public 
offering, reverse takeover or becoming a non-venture issuer, contains similar scaled 
requirements and an abbreviated similar note to readers.126  
 
Venture issuers are not required to make representations relating to the establishment and 
maintenance of DC&P and ICFR.  However, a venture issuer may elect to file Forms 52-
109F1 or 52-109F2, which include representations regarding the establishment and 
maintenance of DC&P and ICFR.  If a venture issuer files these forms, it is not required to 
discuss in its annual or interim MD&A the design or operating effectiveness of DC&P or 
ICFR, but it is suggested by the CSA that it disclose that it is not required to certify the 
design and evaluation of the issuer’s DC&P and ICFR, and set out the inherent limitations 
and risks.  The Companion Policy to NI 52-109 observes that a selective discussion in a 
venture issuer’s MD&A about one or more components of a venture issuer’s DC&P or 
ICFR without these accompanying statements will not provide transparent disclosure of the 
state of the venture issuer’s DC&P or ICFR.127 
 
Hence, this example of proportionate regulation illustrates differentiated standards, with a 
clear caution to investors that a policy line has been drawn in terms of the degree and detail 
of assurances by certifying officers, depending on whether the issuer is a venture or non-
venture issuer.  The Venture Issuer Basic Certificate draws a bright line distinction, 
creating transparency for investors in terms of what expectations they may have about 
officer assurance.  
 
The modified requirements were responsive to market participants that want venture issuers 
to place their resources into effective management and good project development, more 
than highly codified internal corporate governance controls that may not adequately 
balance access to capital for research and development with investor protection.  The 
                                                     
124
 The note specifies that the venture issuer’s certifying officers are responsible for ensuring that processes 
are in place to provide them with sufficient knowledge to support the representations they are making in the 
certificate. 
125
 Companion Policy 52-109CP Certification of Disclosure in Issuers’ Annual and Interim Filings.  
126
 Section 4.5, Proposed NI 52-109. Form 52-109F1 – IPO/RTO;  Form 52-109FV2 and Form 52-109F2. 
127
 Companion Policy, supra, note 125 at 75. 
 36 
distinction is differently focused regulation, as opposed to less rigorous standards.  The 
underlying policy rationale is that many venture issuers have few employees and limited 
financial resources, which make it difficult for them to design DC&P and ICFR without 
incurring significant additional costs, hiring additional employees, or restructuring the 
board of directors and audit committee.  Moreover, the higher risks frequently associated 
with venture issuers are the quality of the project and personnel; and thus regulatory 
intervention should be proportionate and responsive to the need for this disclosure 
foremost. 
 
In summary, the advantage of a type of listing delineation for proportionate regulation is its 
transparency.  Currently, given the structure of the Canadian capital market, 97 per cent of 
the total aggregate Canadian market capitalization is comprised of issuers listed on the TSX 
or TSXV.128  The concentration of the Canadian market on two exchanges allows for ease 
of demarcation for the purposes of proportionate regulation.  Canadian regulators have 
already opted for this delineation in several national instruments.  It creates a measure of 
fairness in that all issuers on an exchange are treated alike and investors can readily make 
choices based on the degree of disclosure and compliance assurances.  There is also 
transparency in the delineation for regulators, in terms of monitoring and enforcement.  The 
transition from one set of requirements is clear; specifically, when an issuer moves to a 
new exchange.  Such an approach has not, to date, harmed access to the US market, as 
overall the size of issuers on the TSXV is considerably smaller than the US delineation of 
small issuer, discussed below.  The venture/non-venture delineation allows issuers the 
freedom to choose what set of compliance rules they wish, depending on their listing.   
 
The type of listing distinction also recognizes the regulatory oversight of the junior equities 
market in Canada.  The TSXV imposes financial listing tests, ongoing listing rules, audit 
committee requirements, and thorough background checks on directors and officers, in 
terms of their relevant business experience, public company experience and history of legal 
and financial regulatory compliance, offering a more rigorous regulatory oversight than 
some other junior exchanges.129  Hence, it is appropriate to adopt regulatory requirements 
that acknowledge this oversight. 
 
The venture/non-venture issuer delineation is unlikely to create incentive effects in terms of 
issuers not being willing to move up to the senior exchange.  Both the TSX and TSXV 
have solidly increasing reputations, and institutional and other investors are increasingly 
willing to invest in venture companies.  While the objective of many companies on the 
TSXV is to move to the TSX, the new proportionate requirements may mean that they 
remain on the TSXV for a greater period of time, graduating, for example, in a year to 15 
months instead of three to six months.  However, the fact that they may be in less of a hurry 
to acquire the additional governance and disclosure requirements could be viewed as a 
positive aspect of a proportionate approach, in that such issuers are likely to move only 
when they have appropriate controls and resources in place to comply with the new 
requirements.  Generally, where the venture issuer is qualified to graduate, it will do so, as 
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graduation is important to its capital raising activities.130  Arguably, any additional time 
that the venture issuer needs to enhance its internal capacity with respect to financial 
controls, governance and disclosure is also of benefit to investors, who will understand the 
different risks associated with the issuer, advancing the goals of investor protection. 
 
The disadvantage may be for smaller issuers on the TSX, who may have the same market 
capitalization as a TSXV issuer, but face a different set of regulatory requirements, thus 
raising the question of fairness.  These issuers may face disproportionate governance 
requirements in terms of time and resources, when the requirements are not responsive to 
legislative and regulatory goals. 
 
With this basis for proportionate regulation, as for the options that follow, public education 
is required for all market participants, particularly potential investors.  There needs to be 
clear understanding of how regulation has been scaled and what it means to investors in 
assessing their risk capacity.  For example, the TSX has continually upgraded its education 
and mentorship programs, so that issuers meet regulatory compliance and investors 
understand the market and business risks associated with different kinds of investment.  
 
(b)  Market Capitalization or Market Float Approach 
 
A second option is to delineate the type of issuer by size.  Such a demarcation for purposes 
of proportionate regulation could be by market capitalization or public float; or as 
discussed below, by consolidated revenue.  There would need to be a nationally prescribed 
standardized methodology for computing size, whatever approach adopted.  
 
The market capitalization approach offers some transparency in that market capitalization 
information is publicly available.  The US has adopted the notion of public float, i.e. 
market capitalization excluding company officers, directors, or controlling-interest 
investors, for greater ease and transparency, as discussed below.  If a market capitalization 
approach were to be adopted for purposes of proportionate regulation in Canada, there 
would have to be clear transition rules specifying how companies would graduate from the 
microcap or smallcap category to non-small company status, in terms of timing, in order to 
ensure fairness of when exactly a company becomes subject to scaled regulatory 
requirements, and transparency for investors. Given that market capitalization can 
fluctuate, companies could arguably hover on either side of a market cap bright line, and 
thus should be measured as of a specified annual date.  While this option would assist with 
transparency, it may give rise to some incentives to manipulate market capitalization to fall 
within particular compliance requirements or incentives to not grow the company, creating 
a measure of unfairness for investors. A key disadvantage of the market capitalization 
approach is that choice of regulatory regime is removed from the issuer, as the market 
determines the issuers’ value. 
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(i)  Market Capitalization 
 
The SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies in 2006 reported that 
proportionality as an underlying principle of US securities regulation had been 
underemphasized, and made a series of recommendations for proportionate regulation.131  It 
recommended regulating based on a stratification of smaller public companies into two 
groups, microcap companies and smallcap companies. Its proposed a system of 
proportionate securities regulation for smaller public companies that would use six 
determinants to define a “smaller public company”: the total market capitalization of the 
company; a measurement metric that facilitates the scaling of regulation; a measurement 
metric that is self-calibrating; a standardized measurement and methodology for computing 
market capitalization; a date for determining total market capitalization; and clear and firm 
transition rules.132  
 
The Committee recommended the use of market capitalization, rather than public float, 
which US regulators have traditionally used to determine eligibility for smaller public 
company treatment, because it concluded that market capitalization better measures total 
financial exposure to investors and the US capital markets than public float. Its view was 
that market capitalization has the advantage of simplicity, as it avoids the sometimes 
difficult problem of deciding for legal purposes which holdings are public float and which 
are not.133 
 
The Committee recommended the development of proportionate regulation for companies 
if they qualify as “microcap companies” because their equity market capitalization places 
them in the lowest 1 per cent of total US equity market capitalization or as “smallcap 
companies” because their market capitalization places them in the next lowest 1 per cent to 
5 per cent of total U.S. market capitalization.134  The Committee summarized the US 
market as follows in its Table 1: 
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Table: Recommendation on Scaled or Proportionate Regulation for Smaller Public Companies 
 Market Capitalization 
Cutoff  
Percentage of Total 
U.S. Market 
Capitalization  
Percentage of All U.S. 
Public Companies  
Microcap 
Companies 
<US$128.2 million 1% 52.6% 
Smallcap 
Companies 
US$128.2-US$787.1 million 5% 25.9% 
Smaller Public 
Companies 
 
<US$787.1 million 6% 78.5% 
Larger Public 
Companies 
>US$787.1 million 94% 21.5% 
 
 
Note that its definition of small cap is set at a considerably higher threshold than in Canada, 
where SMEs are viewed as a market capitalization of CDN$500 million or less.135  The 
differences are due to the smaller size of Canada’s capital market and the fact that 
Canadian issuers tend to access the public equity market at a much earlier stage of their 
growth than companies in the US.136   
 
The Committee’s rationale for recommending proportionate regulation for companies 
falling in the lowest 6 per cent of total US equity market capitalization is that 94 per cent of 
the total US public equity capital market would still have the full benefit and protection of 
federal securities regulation for companies, limiting risk to investors of serious losses.137  
 
The Committee recommended the promulgation of regulations under which all US 
companies with equity securities registered under the Exchange Act would be ranked from 
largest to smallest market capitalization based on a periodic recalculation date. Companies 
would self-determine whether they qualify for microcap and smallcap company treatment 
for the next fiscal year by comparing their market capitalization on the last day of their 
previous fiscal year.  Hence, the measurement metric for determining smaller public 
company status would be “self-calibrating.”138  The Committee did not recommend the 
frequency with which the recalculation should occur, but noted that frequent recalculation, 
even on an annual basis, could introduce an undesirable level of uncertainty into the 
process for companies trying to determine where they fall within the three categories.139 
However, its view was that the recalculation period avoids the problem of setting a dollar 
amount standard that needs to be continually revisited, providing a long-term solution to 
the problem of re-scaling securities regulation for smaller public companies every few 
years.140  
 
The Committee concluded that the benefits of documenting, testing and certifying the 
adequacy of internal controls, while of importance for large issuers, are of less certain 
value for smaller public companies, who rely to a greater degree on the “tone at the top” 
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and high-level monitoring controls to facilitate accurate financial reporting, finding that 
“the result is a cost/benefit equation that, many believe, diminishes shareholder value, 
makes smaller public companies less attractive as investment opportunities and impedes 
their ability to compete”.141   The Committee observed that the primary objective of 
internal control over financial reporting requirements should be the prevention of 
materially inaccurate financial statements; however, different sized companies operate 
differently, and internal control rules should reflect this fact.142  It recommended that, in 
implementing new accounting standards, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) should permit microcap companies to apply the same extended effective dates that 
it provides for private companies.143  The Committee recommended implementing a de 
minimis provision in the application of the SEC’s auditor independence rules.144  
 
In implementing some of the recommended changes of the Committee, the SEC chose to 
retain public float as the delineation for proportionate regulation, instead of market 
capitalization.  
 
(ii) Public Float 
 
Public float is largely a US regulatory concept adjusting market capitalization; essentially it 
is the portion of a company's outstanding shares that is held by public investors, as opposed 
to company officers, directors or controlling-interest investors. Public float has been used 
in the US as the delineation for proportionate regulation.  Effective February 2008, the SEC 
has adopted a new system of disclosure rules for smaller companies filing periodic reports 
and registration statements with the SEC.145  It has expanded the number of companies that 
qualify for its scaled disclosure requirements for smaller reporting companies.146  
 
Under the new system, smaller reporting companies will prepare and file their SEC reports 
and registration statements using the same forms as other SEC reporting companies, though 
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the information required to be disclosed will differ.147  Under the new rules, companies 
qualify as “smaller reporting companies,” and therefore for scaled disclosure, if they have a 
common equity public float of less than US$75 million, which will be the eligibility for 
most issuers.  Alternatively, for companies that are unable to calculate public float, the SEC 
has provided a revenue test.  If a company has no common equity outstanding or no market 
price for its outstanding common equity at the time of its eligibility determination, the 
company would qualify as a smaller reporting company if it had less than US$50 million in 
revenues in the last fiscal year.  These standards differ from the standards that governed 
eligibility for the SEC’s former small company disclosure requirements, which were 
available to “small business issuers,” that had less than US$25 million in public float and 
less than US$25 million in annual revenue.148   
 
Setting the public float ceiling at US$75 million for smaller reporting companies further 
aligned the smaller reporting company definition with the SEC’s non-accelerated filer 
definition.  The SEC has concluded that this standard is appropriately scaled in that it 
reduces costs to smaller companies caused by unnecessary information requirements, 
consistent with investor protection.149  The SEC reports that by eliminating the revenue test 
for most companies, the new definition of smaller reporting company simplifies and 
streamlines the definition while expanding the number of companies eligible to qualify.150  
All companies calculate their public float as of the last business day of their second fiscal 
quarter. The amendments are scaled to reflect the characteristics and needs of smaller 
companies and their investors.151 
 
The SEC rejected the Advisory Committee’s recommendation to move to market 
capitalization as the measure of size, as it concluded that requiring only a public float test 
for most companies to qualify would provide additional simplicity, consistency and 
certainty; and that eliminating a revenue test would broaden the category of eligible 
companies.  Its decision to focus on a company’s non-affiliate common equity market 
capitalization or ‘‘public float’’ was also consistent with the SEC’s current regulatory 
standards for the purposes of Forms 10–K Annual Reporting and S–3 Registration 
Statements and the accelerated filer definition.152 
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The SEC has also acknowledged the need for proportionate regulation in the context of 
Sarbanes-Oxley section 404, auditor attestation requirements.153  It accepted, in part, the 
Committee’s recommendation that the SEC provide exemptive relief to microcap and 
smallcap companies until a framework for assessing the internal control over financial 
reporting for such companies is developed that recognizes their characteristics and 
needs.154 The SEC announced in June 2008 that it has further extended the compliance date 
for smaller public companies (non-accelerated filers), defined as those with less than 
US$75 million in public float, to meet the Section 404(b) auditor attestation requirement of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by one year, for annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after 
December 15, 2009.155  In the interim, the SEC will collect data on the costs and benefits of 
Section 404 implementation, focusing on the consequences for smaller companies and the 
effects of the Section 404 auditor attestation requirements.156  The extension of the Section 
404 compliance date for smaller companies is aimed at reducing unnecessary compliance 
costs for smaller companies while preserving important investor protections.157  
 
One study comparing more than 3,000 small US issuers from 2003 to 2005 and a pre-S-Ox 
404 control period suggests that the exemption has had unintended consequences, 
specifically, that smaller firms have had an incentive to remain below the public float 
threshold.158  It documented that these firms remained small by undertaking less 
investment, making more cash payouts to shareholders through dividends and share 
repurchases, and reducing the number of shares held by non-affiliates.159  The authors also 
found that, because the testing date of a firm’s filing status occurs only once each fiscal 
year, the nonaccelerated filers post-S-Ox have adopted various techniques to exert 
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temporary downward pressure on share prices before testing their filing status, specifically, 
actions related to short-term price impact, such as disclosing bad news in the second fiscal 
quarter and reporting lower accounting earnings in the second fiscal quarter.160  The study 
points out the potential incentive effects from a bright line market capitalization 
delineation. 
 
Overall, the market capitalization approach offers a relatively high degree of transparency, 
in that market capitalization or public float are publicly disclosed.   It offers a high degree 
of fairness in that the size of the issuer determines what set of regulatory requirements an 
issuer will have to meet.  Its negative features are that it requires constant adjustment in 
that market capitalization is highly dynamic.  There need to be clear rules as to the 
appropriate valuation date and the appropriate valuing of market capitalization.  A date too 
frequent for recalculating market capitalization or public float could be costly and time 
consuming for issuers; however, a date too infrequent could create additional risks for the 
market, in that issuers may have grown such that they should be complying with more 
extensive requirements, but are not.   
 
There is also the potential for a fairness issue in respect of investors, in the sense that 
issuers may choose not to grow their market capitalization to remain within the 
capitalization requirements of a smaller issuer.  There may also be fairness issues at the 
margins, in that those issuers close to the cutoff line may move back and forth over the line 
under a market capitalization delineation.    
 
The greatest disadvantage of a market capitalization approach may be the lack of choice for 
issuers.  Its practical result is that, if the company grows to a predetermined arbitrary 
market cap, its regulatory obligations are going to change.  If there are serious market 
swings, issuers could bounce in and out of a category, creating large costs for regulatory 
compliance.  It may also create a stigma associated with such shifts, whereas delineation by 
venture/non-venture retains an element of choice for the issuer in its own risk/reward 
calculation.  There is also some risk, as the US study found, of issuers making 
inappropriate choices about the use of capital, in order to retain small issuer status, which 
could affect investors’ interests and the long term interests of the company. 
 
(c)  Consolidated Revenue Approach 
 
Another size of issuer approach to proportionate regulation is to use consolidated revenue 
as the delineation, which can offer some transparency to investors.  Fairness is engaged in 
that all issuers with the same consolidated revenue are treated the same for regulatory 
purposes.  Another advantage is that it can offer strong evidence of issuer’s financial status 
and does not rely on the liquidity of the market to determine size.  However, consolidated 
revenue by itself may not be the most accurate measure. 
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In 1996, the OSC Task Force on Small Business Financing concluded that gross revenue 
was the best vehicle to measure the appropriate size of an enterprise in the financing 
context because, among other reasons, income and equity may be minimal even for entities 
of considerable size.161  It would have supplemented the revenue test by a market 
capitalization test to recognize issuers with large market capitalizations and insignificant 
revenues, such as exploration stage resource issuers. The Task Force defined SMEs as 
enterprises with not more than CDN$10 million in gross revenues in the most recently 
completed financial year; and market capitalization, calculated on a fully diluted basis prior 
to the proposed offering, of not more than CDN$35 million.162   
 
One example of consolidated revenue being used in conjunction with other tests in Canada 
is the new National Instrument 41-101, General Prospectus Requirements.  Canadian 
regulators expanded the opportunities for issuers to use the short form prospectus process 
by removing the market capitalization eligibility requirements for reporting issuers, at the 
same time as setting out specific requirements for junior and IPO venture issuers.163  NI 41-
101 came into force on March 17, 2008, creating a comprehensive and transparent set of 
national prospectus requirements for all issuers, including certain investment funds.  The 
new rule maintains a high level of disclosure to investors while reducing costs for issuers 
wishing to offer securities in more than one jurisdiction.  The Instrument is based on three 
general principles: harmonization and consolidation of the general prospectus requirements 
among Canadian jurisdictions; harmonization of the general prospectus requirements with 
the continuous disclosure and short form prospectus disclosure regimes; and amendments 
to the principles underlying the general prospectus requirements identified as a result of 
regulatory reviews, applications for exemptive relief and public consultation.164   
 
NI 41-101 came into force at the same time as Multilateral Instrument 11-102, Passport 
System, and new national policies that streamline Canadian regulatory processes for 
prospectuses and exemptive relief applications.  This change opened up to several thousand 
more issuers the possibility of using the short form prospectus process.  The significance of 
the de-emphasis on “point of sale” disclosure is in part an attempt to reduce the regulatory 
burden on issuers raising capital, especially SMEs.165  The practical effect of the expansion 
of NI 44-101 is that the traditional long form prospectus document is retained for IPOs 
only.   
 
NI 41-101 could be viewed as recognition of proportionate regulation in that it removed the 
previous eligibility requirements, opening up the availability of the short form 
prospectuses, but at the same time imposed additional disclosure requirements on IPO 
venture issuers and junior issuers, in recognition that information about them may not be as 
widely disseminated in the market.  A junior issuer is defined as one that files a preliminary 
prospectus, is not a reporting issuer in any jurisdiction, and whose total consolidated assets 
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as at the date of the most recent balance sheet of the issuer included in the preliminary 
prospectus are less than CDN$10 million, whose consolidated revenue as shown in the 
most recent annual income statement of the issuer is less than CDN$10 million, and whose 
shareholders’ equity as at the date of the most recent balance sheet included in the 
preliminary prospectus is less than $10 million.166  Depending on the type of prospectus, 
the Instrument sets timelines for determining revenue dates.167   
 
A junior issuer must disclose additional information; specifically, the total funds available 
and the following breakdown of those funds: the estimated net proceeds from the sale of 
the securities offered under the prospectus; the estimated consolidated working capital 
(deficiency) as at the most recent month end before filing the prospectus; and the total other 
funds available to be used to achieve the principal purposes identified by the junior 
issuer.168  A junior issuer that had negative operating cash flow in its most recently 
completed financial year for which financial statements have been included in the 
prospectus, must disclose the period of time the proceeds raised under the prospectus are 
expected to fund operations, the estimated total operating costs necessary for the issuer to 
achieve its stated business objectives, and the estimated amount of other material capital 
expenditures during that period of time.169   
 
NI 44-101 also distinguishes IPO venture issuers, meaning an issuer that files a long form 
prospectus; is not a reporting issuer in any jurisdiction immediately before the date of the 
final long form prospectus; and, at the date of the long form prospectus, does not have any 
of its securities listed or quoted, has not applied to list or quote any of its securities, and 
does not intend to apply to list or quote any of its securities, on the TSX, a US and other 
foreign marketplace, other than AIM or the PLUS markets.  If the issuer is a venture issuer 
or an IPO venture issuer that has not had significant revenue from operations in either of its 
last two financial years, it must disclose a breakdown of material components of capitalized 
or expensed exploration and development costs, expensed research and development costs, 
deferred development costs, general and administrative expenses, and additional specified 
information.170  
 
Thus, NI 44-101 is a form of targeted regulation, recognizing the need to focus the 
disclosures of those issuers without a history in the market.  
 
In the UK, the FSA defines small firms in its Prospectus Directive as companies, which, 
according to their last annual or consolidated accounts, meet at least two of the following 
three criteria: an average number of employees during the financial year of less than 250, a 
total balance sheet not exceeding €43 million and an annual net turnover not exceeding €50 
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million. Small Business is defined as a partnership, body corporate, unincorporated 
association or mutual association with an annual turnover of less than £1 million or its 
equivalent in any other currency at the relevant time.171  In the US, the SEC Advisory 
Committee on Smaller Public Companies recommended that the SEC provide exemptive 
relief from the S-Ox 404 requirements based primarily on a revenue test172  Small public 
companies requesting exemption would have to establish that the estimated costs of 
compliance would overly burden the company.  As noted above, the SEC offered smaller 
issuers some relief in June 2008, but based on the pre-existing non-accelerated filer status. 
 
Thus while a consolidated revenue delineation has been used in combination with other 
measures of size or sophistication in a few circumstances, it does not align with stock 
exchange listing requirements. Junior issuers could face differing and perhaps conflicting 
regulatory requirements if such an approach were adopted as a stand-alone threshold.  
However, consolidated revenue could be used in conjunction with market capitalization for 
very targeted proportionate regulation.   
 
An example is the requirement for ICFR under NI 52-109.  The TSX, in its submission to 
regulators regarding the instrument, proposed that smaller TSX issuers should be able to 
avail themselves of the ICFR design accommodation, based on a threshold of annual 
audited revenue of CDN$2 million or a market capitalization of CDN$75 million or less, or 
CDN$2 million in revenue and a market capitalization of CDN$300 million or less.173  It 
suggested that rather than creating a system of individual issuers seeking relief from the 
requirements, the accommodation could be available for issuers below such a threshold.  It 
observed that the available guidance offered by the COSO framework does not take into 
account the organizational structure and staff complement that characterizes many SME 
issuers on the TSX and that the CSA should develop a principles-based internal control 
framework for SME issuers to allow issuers the appropriate tools that will assist them in 
designing and evaluating ICFR, recognizing multiple sectors and the fact that SME issuers 
do not have extensive internal control/risk management functions.174 
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(d)  Sector Approach 
 
Another possible point of delineation is by sector, which is another variation on a market 
capitalization distinction, as particular sectors tend have certain market capitalization 
characteristics.  Canada’s capital market has regional markets based on the type of 
issuer.175 Based on aggregate public market capitalization, the Canadian capital market is 
primarily represented by six major industrial groups: oil & gas; financial services; mining; 
diversified industries; media and communications; and technology.  Based on market 
capitalization, the most significant industries are oil & gas, financial services and mining, 
in that order. Sectoral proportionate regulation may not be a viable choice, as it lacks 
fairness and transparency.  There are, as noted above, specific disclosure requirements for 
particular sectors, in terms of mandatory technical information, but these requirements are 
focused regulation that does not reduce the burden of smaller issuer regulation.  The OSC 
Task Force on Small Business Financing in 1996 concluded that tailoring the thresholds on 
an industry-by-industry basis would undermine the objective of comprehensible 
regulation.176 
 
In sum, there are a variety of criteria that could potentially serve as the threshold or 
delineation for purposes of proportionate regulation.  A canvass of Canadian securities 
regulators indicates that most of the provincial and territorial securities regulators view 
their jurisdiction as not explicitly having proportionate regulation in place, other than 
through the endorsement of national instruments and policies.  Regulators in Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, the Northwest Territories 
and the Yukon have no explicit proportionate regulation based on size or market 
capitalization unique to their jurisdictions; and no plans to develop and implement 
proportionate regulation outside of the CSA initiated changes.177  One regulator suggested 
that it would be too much of an administrative burden to create different sets of rules for 
smaller companies.178  A unique regional or provincial approach to proportionate regulation 
was viewed as prohibitive on a cost basis.  The provinces that have smaller capital markets 
and regulatory structures advised that they generally follow the lead of Ontario and other 
provinces with more active capital markets.  
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Since British Columbia has embraced outcomes-based regulation, the BCSC has observed 
that it is unclear whether proportionate regulation will play an important role in the 
province’s securities regulation.179  Under its approach, the tools for firm compliance are 
tailored according to specific outcomes; hence, there is not much need for size-based 
regulation.180  In its submission to the Expert Panel, the BCSC chose not to comment on 
the issue of proportionate regulation, other than to note that any consideration to expand or 
limit proportionate regulation should be based on the experience to date with proportionate 
regulation in Canada.181   
 
The Alberta Securities Commission (ASC) has expressed some interest in pursuing 
proportionate regulation, given the make-up of Alberta’s companies.182  ASC has internally 
produced some documents considering how it would be structured; however, none of them 
have been finalized or published.183  Alberta's capital market represents a mix of senior and 
junior issuers, and the ASC is considering how one could implement tiered regulation more 
effectively.    
 
In Ontario, the OSC’s Small Business Advisory Committee acknowledged the needs of 
small issuers, as discussed above.184 The OSC has been very active in creating more 
appropriate standards for venture issuers in the national instruments discussed above.  It 
considered asset-based regulation; however, the OSC concluded that such method was not 
transparent and was too difficult for administrators to apply and investors to understand. 
For example, the OSC has observed that issuer assets may fluctuate from year to year for 
the purposes of MD&A; thus, the same issuer could be caught by the rule in one year, but 
not in the following year.185 Thus the OSC has concluded that the type of listing approach 
was the most transparent.186     
 
In Québec, l'Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) reports that it has not published any 
documents relating to proportionate regulation, and has not taken a public position on this 
issue to date.187  However, proportionate regulation may already to some extent be reflected 
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in the efforts undertaken by the AMF to harmonize requirements relating to issuers and 
registrants with other jurisdictions, including the passport system and national instruments.  
 
Nova Scotia does not have proportionate regulation in the public markets, other than 
national instruments.188   However, Nova Scotia has an equity tax credit for small cap 
companies that issue securities, called the Community Economic Development 
Corporations Program (CEDCP).189 Corporations that qualify must complete different 
filing requirements with respect to financial statements, press release obligations, and other 
documents.190  Some key points for corporations that qualify under this program are that 
issuers must have less than CDN$25 million in assets or revenue including all affiliated 
corporations or associations.191  They must use a prescribed Offering Document, and are 
prohibited from selling more than CDN$3 million in any one offering.  The program has 
prescribed time frames in which to complete the offering, and issuers must obtain a letter of 
non-objection from the Nova Scotia Securities Commission and a Tax Credit Certificate 
from the Nova Scotia Department of Finance.192  Nova Scotia also has some proportionate 
regulation for its Community Economic Development Investment Fund (CEDIF), which is 
a pool of capital formed through the sale of common shares to persons within a defined 
community, aimed at encouraging business investment in the region.193   
 
CSA is also assessing the possibility of expanding the scope of proportionate regulation, in 
terms of testing whether regulators can develop appropriate responses applicable to the 
entire Canadian capital market each time a regulatory initiative is introduced; if they 
cannot, considering different regulations for different sized companies. 
 
6.  Proportionate Regulation for Seasoned or Larger Issuers  
 
While not the focus of this paper, it merits note that proportionate regulation could benefit 
more experienced or larger participants in the Canadian capital market.  In the US, the SEC 
has adopted a series of rules for well-known seasoned issuers (WKSIs) that relaxed 
restrictions imposed on public offerings.  The Securities Offering Reform Rules create a 
new class of WKSIs comprised of issuers that are presumed to be the most widely followed 
in the marketplace.194  WKSIs can use a new "automatic shelf registration" process, which 
allows them to register unspecified amounts of specified types or classes of securities on 
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immediately effective registration statements, without allocating between primary and 
secondary offerings and can exclude more information from the base prospectus. It 
eliminates the delivery requirement for final prospectuses.195 
 
The shelf registration rules for WKSIs allow more flexibility and faster issuing. It loosens 
"quiet period" rules that govern what the issuer can say before and during offering. 
Communications by issuers more than 30 days before filing a registration statement will be 
permitted without violating the "gun jumping" provisions, as long as they do not refer to an 
offering that is the subject of a registration statement. For prospectus delivery, access 
equals delivery, hence electronic access is sufficient.   
 
The idea of proportionate regulation for seasoned issuers was developed at some length in 
one of the research studies for the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in 
Canada.  Professor Pritchard recommended that Canada could adopt a version of WKSI 
status for the top tier of the TSX as part of streamlining the prompt offering prospectus 
(POP) system.196  The study suggested that careful consideration should be given to the 
appropriate standards for WKSI status in Canada, recommending that a standard of 
CDN$350 million in market capitalization would strike a balance between the need for 
information for investors and the economies available from streamlined regulation.197  
 
The Task Force adopted that recommendation in its final report, recommending that 
Canadian well-known seasoned issuer (C-WKSI) status be granted based on the CDN$350 
million cap standard where issuers meet the qualification criteria for the POP system. The 
Task Force offered detailed suggestions as to the type of information that would be 
required for C-WKSI issuers to undertake follow on offerings without regulatory review.198 
   
7.  Broad Principles and Basic Tools 
 
The above discussion illustrates that there are at least eight principal tools that can be used 
to implement proportionate regulation:  
o Exemption of junior issuers from specific requirements, because the time and 
resources of imposing such requirements on junior issuers outweighs any 
benefits of protection of the market. 
o Scaled timelines, recognizing that junior issuers must access external resources 
to comply and thus require longer periods to compile accurate periodic 
disclosure. 
o Transition timelines, which allow junior issuers longer to put in place new 
required governance, financial controls, or other new standards, where it is 
determined that they are necessary to advance the public policy goals of the 
system. 
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o Different frequency of reporting, such as semi-annually instead of quarterly, 
where it is determined that investors and other market participants may not be 
interested in quarterly financial reporting if they are receiving timely, full and 
accurate material change disclosure. 
o Modified requirements in terms of formal governance or internal control 
requirements and the level of detail of disclosure, by modifying a rule that 
applies to all issuers for junior issuers. 
o Tailored requirements, which set disclosure requirements based on technical 
information particular to a sector, to the issuer’s history in the market, or to its 
revenue generating capacity. 
o Guidance as to best practice, in terms of offering junior issuers information and 
guidance on a range of compliance options that may be responsive to their 
capital and operational structure, such as the design of control systems. 
o Use of high level principles that should govern the conduct of issuers, and then 
allow issuers to develop best practices appropriate to their size or resources 
based on a principles/standards/outcomes based system.   
 
For each of these tools, it is important to consider how they advance the goals of efficient 
capital markets and investor protection; and to consider what is material and relevant to 
market participants.  Proportionate regulation should be viewed as scaled or focused to a 
type of issuer, rather than the introduction of less rigorous standards.  Investors must 
understand the difference between market risk, i.e. that although the junior issuer had 
complied with all regulatory requirements, the business may fail because the resource or 
technology cannot be developed, and regulatory risk, in terms of whether or not the tools 
chosen for proportionate regulation minimize the risk of issuer misconduct or shirking. 
 
A key decision is the determination of any threshold.  As discussed earlier, the type of 
issuer (junior or venture) and the size of issuer (by market cap or consolidated revenue) 
offer different kinds of thresholds.  While there may be limited circumstances in which 
more than one threshold is used, there is a risk of fragmentation where small issuers could 
fall in different categories for different purposes, adding to cost and confusion.  In cases 
where it is critically important that there be a different threshold, there should be 
transparency and certainty regarding the threshold and a solid rationale for creating a 
different bright line.  However, there could be instances where there is a single standard, 
but the resulting practice, such as DC&P or ICFR, are scaled to the size and type of issuer. 
 
Another determination is where securities regulation could benefit from consideration of 
proportionate regulation in new areas.  The exempt market, takeover bid regulation, and 
continuous disclosure requirements could all be candidates for change. Under a 
principles/standards/outcomes-based regulatory model, one would have to develop the high 
level principles first and then allow the development of best practices, which in turn would 
likely generate a fresh look at proportionate regulation in areas such as officer certification, 
corporate governance and offering documents.  Regulators could examine these areas in 
considering any guidance they were to issue under a principles/standards/outcomes-based 
system.   
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A number of overriding principles or considerations can be drawn from the above 
discussion, which should be considered in respect of a further move towards proportionate 
regulation.  They include: 
• Proportionate regulation must balance access to capital and the long term 
sustainability of the market; a key objective is maintaining the integrity of Canadian 
capital markets.  
 
• The benchmark of the regulatory system continues to be materiality, in that while 
periodic disclosure or other compliance requirements may be proportionate, all 
issuers must continue to ensure that material change is disclosed to the market in a 
timely, accurate and comprehensible manner, a requirement that should not be 
scaled.199 
 
• Decision making in respect of adopting further proportionate regulation should be 
timely, transparent and relevant for market participants and should be implemented 
only after broad consultation.  A possible methodology is to identify a problem or 
difficulty that may justify a proportionate response and then work with market 
participants to scale the requirement appropriately, using one or more of the tools 
cited above or other problem solving strategies. 
 
• There is a need for transparency and bright line delineation in respect of which issuers 
fall in which category of proportionate regulatory requirements. 
 
• Investors must have a clear understanding of the risk associated with issuers that 
comply with modified disclosure and governance requirements, including explanatory 
notes on periodic reporting documents and prospectuses, public education and plain 
language disclosure. 
 
• If the delineation is venture/non-venture, smaller issuers on the TSX and comparable 
exchanges must be given guidance regarding compliance with the more extensive 
requirements. 
 
• If the delineation is market capitalization, at either end of the market size, there is a 
need for well-founded and transparent criteria on which to make of determination of 
which category issuers are located. 
 
• Disclosed risk factors should be focused for all issuers, not overly generalized. 
 
• Any proportionate regulation must be accompanied by consistent and rigorous 
compliance and enforcement, to ensure integrity of the market. 
 
                                                     
199
 Beyond the scope of this paper is the important issue of whether a more helpful standard would be 
material information as opposed to material change. 
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• Proportionate regulation can be used to reduce disproportionate compliance costs by 
eliminating regulatory compliance requirements where they do not add value to the 
integrity of the market. 
 
• Any proportionate regulation should recognize the extensive oversight of junior 
issuers by the TSXV. 
 
• Any proportionate regulation must ensure that the costs of compliance associated 
with any new requirements do not outweigh the benefits to market participants. 
 
• Under a shift to a principles/standards/outcomes based system, all market participants 
must have a shared understanding of regulatory expectations, specifically, what broad 
high level principles mean in practice.  
 
o Develop high level principles that are universal and allow junior issuers to 
develop best practices sensitive to their structure and needs. 
o The flexibility of principles/standards/outcomes regulation should be used to 
focus requirements on junior issuers, rather than create opaque expectations. 
o There should be recognition that there is a continuum of principles/standards 
and outcomes based regulation, and that any further shifts should occur after 
measured consideration of benefits to the market, involving broad based and 
meaningful consultation. 
o Any evolution from existing standards should be measured, in terms of 
assessing what outcomes a shift from current rules to principles or outcomes is 
aimed at achieving and measuring the effectiveness of any shifts. 
o Regulators assessing good governance practice should share that experience 
with other market participants, increasing the overall knowledge base of good 
practice. 
o Resources need to be directed towards junior issuers in terms of supporting any 
shift to principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation and transparent and 
accessible guidance on best practice, so that junior issuers can develop the 
capacity to meet practice compliance under any adopted principles. 
o Resources are needed to allow junior issuers to participate in a meaningful way 
with regulators in developing future policy or practice. 
o Set appropriate strategic milestones for junior or small issuers. 
 
• Consultation regarding any shift to proportionate regulation and 
principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation should be broad, including all market 
participants, advocacy organizations and exchanges. 
 
• Any further move towards proportionate regulation should engage market participants 
in consideration of regulatory standards and how they differentially impact market 
participants. 
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• There should be wide-spread public education regarding the different risks associated 
with issuers that are proportionately regulated. 
 
• Evaluation of proportionate regulation, under whatever type of system is adopted, 
should measure outcomes against clearly articulated goals, including assessing clear 
milestones, measure the culture of compliance, cost effectiveness, ease of 
implementation, reduction of investor and market risk, and benefits to market 
participants. 
 
o Regulators need to develop tools for assessing compliance if a 
principles/standards and outcomes based approach is adopted. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
Particular features of Canada’s capital market inform our consideration of moving towards 
a more proportionate regulatory system, specifically, Canada has a large number of small 
public companies; its market cap is concentrated largely in four provinces; it has a 
particular focus on mining, resources and technology; and a significant number of issuers 
are cross-listed on US exchanges.  Any further move towards proportionate regulation must 
take account of these unique features. 
 
A proportionate regulatory system could adopt broad high level principles, similar to the 
FSA, as the backdrop for proportionate regulation. These principles could include that an 
issuer must act with integrity and conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence; it 
must take reasonable care to control its affairs responsibly, using size-appropriate risk 
management systems; it must observe proper standards of market conduct and have regard 
to the interests of its investors, creditors and customers and treat them fairly; it must 
disclose material information in a timely, accurate and accessible manner; and it must deal 
with its regulators in an open co-operative manner.   
 
Canadian securities regulators have already recognized some measure of proportionate 
regulation in their national instruments based on the type of listing, and the process of 
building consensus allows for further development of proportionate regulation in a manner 
that is responsive to regional differences and to the unique size of Canadian issuers, the 
particular sectors, and the earlier periods in which junior issuers come to public markets. 
 
The venture/non-venture distinction for proportionate regulation appears to be the most 
convenient delineation in Canada, given the high degree of concentration of Canadian 
listings on the TSX and TSXV.  However, a proportionate system could analyse whether 
there are instances in which market capitalization for junior issuers may be a more 
appropriate criterion for an exemption from particular regulatory requirements.  A market 
capitalization approach may meet fairness considerations in terms of treating similarly 
sized issuers the same, but as the discussion of the SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller 
Public Companies’ criteria suggests, using a number of determinants to define a “smaller 
public company” such as the total market capitalization of the company and a measurement 
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metric that is self-calibrating and facilitates the scaling of regulation, may create 
considerable transaction costs.  If implemented, it will require clear and firm transition 
rules; and clear rules as to the appropriate valuation date and the appropriate valuing of 
market capitalization.  What the above noted principles suggest is that there are multiple 
ways in which junior or small issuers can be accommodated through scaled requirements, 
and there may be instances in which more than one delineation is used.   
 
Canada could possibly benefit from the introduction of a system similar to the NOMAD 
system in the UK, although there would have to be consideration of the cost consequences 
to junior issuers, given their size in Canada.  There would also need to be an assessment of 
the risks associated with moving this aspect of the regulatory system into the private 
sphere.  Given that Canadian issuers go to the market earlier in their development, any 
consideration of such a system would have to measure the risks and benefits that are unique 
to the size and structure of the Canadian market.  Moreover, the slow but steady increase in 
foreign issuers listed in Canada may raise new questions about accepted levels of internal 
governance controls and compliance norms that should be carefully considered.  
 
The paper canvasses how proportionate regulation can operate under different regulatory 
structures.  Clearly, it is being introduced within the passport system in an innovative and 
thoughtful manner, as discussed at length in part 5.  A move towards a more principles and 
outcomes based system would offer opportunities for further development of proportionate 
regulation under any regulatory structure adopted.  In terms of proportionate regulation 
under a hybrid securities law structure, a common regulator could continue to develop 
proportionate regulation on a national basis, in a timely fashion, having regard for regional 
needs and input as discussed above.200  While national buy-in of all jurisdictions would be 
the goal of any new regulatory principles or standards for junior or seasoned issuers, all 
issuers would have the potential to immediately opt into a proportionate regulation system 
by registering with the common regulator.  In essence, there would be a market for 
registration, as issuers could list with the common regulator or with a passport provincial 
jurisdiction.  
 
Ultimately, the best approach to further developing proportionate regulation is one that 
offers a transparent public debate on both its advantages and disadvantages.  That debate 
needs to take place in the context of a move towards greater principles and outcomes-based 
approaches and within the context of a regulatory framework that is more efficient and 
effective at regulating Canadian capital markets. 
 
 
                                                     
200
 Under such a system, provincial or territorial regulators could opt to authorize the common regulator to 
undertake all regulation and oversight in their jurisdiction, thus becoming part of a national regulatory 
system, or could opt to carry on as a regulator under the passport system.  
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